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WILL JEWISH PRISONERS BE BOERNE AGAIN?
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO CITY OF BOERNE
V. FLORES
Yehuda M. Braunstein*
"An inmate's conscience is no less inviolable than that of an unconfined citizen .... "'
INTRODUCTION

Religious observance in prison enables an inmate to "reclaim his
dignity and reassert his individuality."2 Although a prisoner is compelled to forego most of his personal freedom during a prison sentence, studies have shown that religion in prison should not be
curtailed because religion has proven to be a useful form of rehabilitation for prisoners. 3 In the prison environment, religion can also help
one find self-identity and self-respect. 4 For an observant Jevish prisoner, incarceration presents many challenges above and beyond what
other prisoners face.' In every facet of life, an observant Jew is bound
by Biblical principles that have been passed down from generation to
generation. A Jewish prisoner must continue to observe all aspects of
Judaism despite the prison setting. Jewish prisoners, however, have
found that the level of religious observance permitted in prison is
strongly related to the judicial standards used to evaluate their free
exercise claims.6 Consequently, Jewish prisoners have seen their free

exercise protection fluctuate during the past thirty years. During
these thirty years, for the most part, Jewish prisoners' free exercise
claims were governed by pro-inmate judicial standards which led to
many prisoner victories.
On June 25, 1997, however, in City of Boerne v. Flores,7 the

Supreme Court struck a blow to religious freedom when it held that
* I would like to thank and dedicate this Note to my wife Chavi, and children,
Son and Pinny, for always being there for me. I would also like to thank my parents,
in-laws, grandparents, and entire family for their constant support and guidance. Additionally, I am grateful to Professor Abraham Abramovsky and David Zweibel, Director of Government Affairs and General Counsel of Agudath Israel of America, for
their insightful comments and invaluable assistance.
1. Comment, The Religious Rig/us of the Incarcerated, 125 U. Pa. L Rev. 812,
853-54 (1977) [hereinafter Religious Rights].
2. Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnotes omitted).
3. See infra Part IV.C.
4. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("[T]he needs for identity and self-respect are more compelling in the dehumanizing
prison environment.").
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Parts I-II.
7. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority8 in enacting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). 9 As many religious
leaders correctly predicted, without the RFRA's protection, religious
inmates have been subject to a lower level of constitutional protection
of their free exercise. 1° In response to Boerne, many politicians and
religious groups have advocated various legislative proposals designed
to protect religious freedom.'
This Note discusses four legislative proposals which are intended to
supply much needed free exercise protection to religious groups. Part
I of this Note explores a number of religious practices that Jewish prisoners must fulfill on a daily basis. Then, this part traces the historical
development of First Amendment rights of prisoners focusing on how
courts have balanced prisoner rights against the penological interests
of prison administration. Part II discusses the recent standards governing free exercise in general which ultimately led Congress to enact
the RFRA. Part II also examines the Senate debates surrounding the
RFRA which primarily focused on whether a prisoner exemption
should be included in the RFRA. As this part discusses, the amendment was defeated and the RFRA provided strict protection of religious liberty until its invalidation in City of Boerne v. Flores.2 Part III
of this Note explores three proposals suggested by legislators which
have been tailored to provide RFRA-like protection of free exercise.
This part analyzes the three proposals and explains why each one is
not the ideal solution to protect religious freedom. Finally, Part IV
categorizes and analyzes the various state RFRAs that have been advocated during the last few months. Because prisoners require strong
protection of their free exercise, this Note concludes that in order to
efficiently and immediately protect the free exercise of religious prisoners, all states should pass their own RFRAs using the language of
the federal RFRA.
I.

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF FREE EXERCISE FOR
RELIGIOUS PRISONERS

Prior to the 1960s, religious prisoners were generally not permitted
to engage in religious activities. Moreover, courts did not interfere
with prison regulations which burdened religion, choosing instead to
defer to the decisions of prison administration. Since then, religious
prisoners in penal institutions throughout the country have been
granted a limited amount of freedom which enables them to practice
their religion. Although religious observance in prison has become
more routine, the standards applied by courts to evaluate prisoner
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 2172.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
See infra notes 317-22 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts III-IV.
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
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claims have fluctuated during the last thirty years. This part begins
with a discussion of the various religious practices that an observant
Jewish prisoner is obligated to perform. This part then traces the development of judicial protection of prisoners' First Amendment rights,
including free exercise, which originated with Cooper v. Pate. 3 This
part also explores the various standards that were implemented by the
Supreme Court in the thirty years between Cooper and the 1993 enactment of the RFRA. Finally, this part analyzes how courts have
balanced these religious interests with legitimate penological objectives such as deterrence of crime, the rehabilitation of prisoners, and
institutional security.14
A. Religious Observances Required of Jewish Prisoners
Every facet of a religiously observant Jew's life is guided by principles which have been practiced for over five thousand years. When an
observant Jew is incarcerated, the demands of his religion do not
evaporate. Thus, Jewish prisoners have faced difficult challenges from
prison administration when attempting to practice their religion to the
fullest extent. This section discusses the various religious practices
that an observant Jew is obligated to perform.
1. Kosher Diet
Jewish dietary law has its origin in Biblical law.'- These laws developed over time through rabbinical legislation and custom."b The practice of keeping a strict kosher diet is known as Kashruth.Y The three
biggest areas of concern in a strict kosher diet are: (a) forbidden
foods; (b) preparation of permitted foods; and (c) separation of permitted foods.'
13. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (holding that a prisoner stated a cause of
action when he alleged that prison officials prohibited him from purchasing religious
books solely because of his religious beliefs).
14. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
15. See Genesis 32:33; Exodus 22:30: Exodus 23:19 (establishing the basic tenets of
a kosher diet).
16. See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 579 A.2d 316, 320 n.8 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (discussing how rabbinical authorities codified kosher dietary law approximately 800 years ago).
17. See Yacov Lipschutz, Kashruth 15-16 (1988). There are many purposes behind
the laws of keeping a kosher diet. See J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic
Problems 59 (1989). Professor Bleich states that the food one consumes "has a
profound effect upon his spiritual well-being." Id. "For a Jew the body is not simply a
vessel serving as a container of a sacred soul, but is itself an instrument of spirituality." Id Throughout Jewish history, Jews have suffered persecution rather than eat
non-kosher food. See Lipschutz, supra, at 16. "The affirmation that kashruth gives to
[a Jew's] spiritual qualities is the eternal pleasure that true Torah observance brings to
life." Id.
18. Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 17-46.
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The Torah19 establishes the physical traits that an animal must possess to be considered kosher.20 In particular, an animal is kosher if its
hooves are split and it chews its cud.2 1 Kosher dietary law also has
strict rules governing the types of fowl and sea animals that may be
eaten.22 Sea animals are kosher if they possess fins and scales. 23
Swordfish, catfish, sharks, whales, and dolphins are just a few examples of non-kosher fish.24 The Torah does not describe the physical
characteristics that fowl must possess to be kosher, yet it gives a list of
non-kosher fowl which includes the eagle and hawk, among other
birds. 25 Only birds "that through the generations have been by tradition positively identified as kosher may be accepted as a kosher species. '' 26 Finally, as a general rule, fruits, vegetables, and some cereals
are considered kosher.27
Kosher meat is also subject to strict rules regarding its preparation.28 Most importantly, the flesh of a kosher animal may be eaten
only after the animal has been slaughtered 9 by a "shochet," a Godfearing individual possessing skill, piety, and expertise in the slaughtering process. 30 After the animal has been slaughtered properly, a
qualified individual examines various organs to certify that the animal
is kosher.31 Once a qualified individual has completed his meticulous
examination of the organs, certain forbidden parts of the animal must
be removed.3" For example, the Torah prohibits the eating of certain
fats,33 as well as the sciatic nerve, which is located in the hindquarter

of an animal.34 Finally, there is a prohibition against eating the blood
of any fowl or beast.35 To abide by the prohibition against consuming
19. Torah is the Hebrew word that refers to the Bible. New Comprehensive Shilo
Dictionary 20 (7th ed. 1989).
20. Leviticus 11:3. For a comprehensive list of kosher and non-kosher animals, see
Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 79 [hereinafter Yoreh Deah].
21. Leviticus 11:3. The pig, hare, and camel are just three of the many animals
that are forbidden. Id. at 11:3-11:9.
22. Id. at 11:9-19.
23. Id. at 11:9.
24. See Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 48.
25. Leviticus 11:13-19.
26. Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 18. Some examples of kosher poultry include:
chicken, turkey, duck, and pigeons. See id.
27. Id. at 79.
28. See generally id. at 19-39 (discussing at length the entire process of slaughtering, examining, and koshering meat).
29. Deuteronomy 12:21; Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 19, 21.
30. Babylonian Talmud, Chullin 28a; Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 21.
31. See Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 22. "Traditionally, a shochet must receive.., a
document from a Rabbinic authority testifying that he is learned in the laws of
[slaughtering], and trustworthy in its performance." Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 26-30.
33. Leviticus 7:23.
34. Genesis 32:33.
35. See Leviticus 7:26 ("You shall not eat any blood,... whether it be fowl or
beast.").
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blood, there is an extraction process known as "koshering" the meat
which entails soaking, salting, or broiling the meat-"
Kosher dietary law also prohibits eating dairy and meat products
together. 7 This prohibition derives from the Biblical passage: "You
shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk."-38 Furthermore, a "nearly
universal tradition"39 requires a six-hour time period to elapse before
one may eat dairy foods after having eaten meat." Finally, because
meat and milk cannot be mixed together in any form, the "observant
kosher home maintains a full separation of all meat and milk utensils"
which should be readily identifiable so that one will not come to use
the milk utensils for meat or vice-versa."1 One adhering to the basic
laws of Judaism must maintain a strict kosher diet at all times, even
when incarcerated.42
2. Wearing a Yarmulke4 3
It is customary for an observant Jewish male over the age of three
to wear a yarmulke." Yarmulkes and other forms of headcoverings
have been worn by Jewish males since the Talmudic era, two thousand
years ago.4 Talmudic and rabbinical authorities have delineated the
purposes underlying the obligation to wear a yarmulke." It is strictly
forbidden for an observant Jewish male to make a blessing or pray
with his head uncovered.47 Many authorities hold that it is also forbidden to travel even a small distance, such as six feet, without wear36. See Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 30-39.
37. See Yoreh Deah, supra note 20, at 87-97, for a thorough analysis of the laws
pertaining to the separation of milk and meat products.

38. Exodus 23:19; 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21. The Talmud states that because this
verse is mentioned three times in the Torah, there are three prohibitions: (a) it is

forbidden to cook meat and dairy together; (b) it is also forbidden to eat meat and
milk together, and (c) no benefit may be derived from meat and milk cooked to-

gether. See Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 40-41.
39. Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 42.
40. Id.;
see also Yoreh Deah, supra note 20, at 89:1 (noting that six hours is the

appropriate time period to wait before eating dairy if one has eaten meat); Maimonides, Maacholos Asuros 9:28 (same).
41. Lipschutz, supra note 17, at 43 (citing Yoreh Deah, supra note 20, at 89).
42. United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 692 (E.D.N.Y.), affd sub nont.,
Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (summarizing the testimony of Rabbi
Moishe D. Tendler).
43. A yarmulke is a headcovering worn by Jewish males. Webster's Third New
Int'l Dictionary 2647 (3d ed. 1986).

44. See Simcha Bunim Cohen, Children in Halachah 14 (1993).
45. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbath 156b.

46. See id. (stating that a yarmulke reminds one to fear God); Babylonian Talmud,
Kiddushin 31a (holding that a Jewish male should not walk even a short distance

without a head covering because the holiness of God permeates above); Maharshah,
Shabbath 156b (noting that the purpose of a yarmulke is to remind a Jew of God's

presence).
47. See Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 206"3 [hereinafter Orach
Chaim].
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ing a yarmulke.48 The above authorities demonstrate the enormous
importance to an observant Jew of wearing a yarmulke at all times,
even if he is incarcerated.
3. Prayer
Prayer is the primary means by which a Jew serves God.4 9 When a

Jew prays, it is imperative that his mind be totally free of distractions
so that he can appreciate the words of the prayers."0 Prayers should
be said with a feeling of awe and humility, and should be done with a
feeling of happiness brought on by the knowledge of God's perpetual
kindness and mercy to all creatures. 1 An observant Jew has an obligation to pray three times daily; once in the morning, afternoon, and
evening.
Ideally, prayer is most effective when done with a
"minyan," a group of ten Jewish men over the age of thirteen.53 In
fact, Rabbi Yosef Karo, a prominent authority on Jewish Law, stated
that one should make his best efforts to pray in a synagogue or with a
minyan.54
4. Observing Sabbath
Much of Jewish law is dedicated to the principles of Sabbath observance.55 Indeed, the Ten Commandments mandate every Jew to "remember the day of Sabbath to sanctify it. Six days a week you shall
'
work.... And on the seventh day ...you shall not do any work."56

This practice of working six days and resting on the seventh is reminiscent of the world's creation, which occurred in six days.57 Therefore, it
is incumbent upon an observant Jew to refrain from working on Sabbath even if it results in one losing his or her job.58 This prohibition
refers to working for an employer, as well as performing household
tasks such as cooking, turning on a light, and gardening, inter alia.9 In
addition, traveling in a vehicle on Sabbath is strictly forbidden.6" Jew48. See Bablyonian Talmud, Kiddushin 31:1 ("[A] person should not walk four
cubits with his head uncovered."); Yoel Sirkash, Beis Chadash, Orach Chaim 2:6 ("[I1t
is appropriate not to travel at all without a head covering."); Maimonides, Dayos 5:6
(same).
49. See Maimonides, Tefilah 1:1.
50. Orach Chaim, supra note 47, at 98:1.
51. Id. at 93:2.
52. See Maimonides, Tefilah, 1:8.
53. See Abraham Abili, Mogen Avrohom, Orach Chaim 90:9:15.
54. Orach Chaim, supra note 47, at 90:9.

55. Yehoshua Y. Neuwirth, Shemirath Shabbath xxx-xxxi (1984).
56. Exodus 20:8-10. The commandment to sanctify the Sabbath is the fourth of
the Ten Commandments. Id. at 20:8-11.
57. Id. at 20:11.
58. See Orach Chaim, supra note 47, at 308:3 (discussing that on Sabbath it is
impermissible to engage in certain activities even if it results in a financial loss).
59. See generally Neuwirth, supra note 55 (outlining the everyday tasks which are
forbidden on Sabbath).
60. Id. § 33:3, at 547.
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ish prisoners, therefore, are forbidden to work or travel in any vehicle
on Sabbath. 6 '
B. Development of Prisoners' First Amendment Rights
The founding fathers deemed freedom of religion to be such a fundamental right that it was the first right enumerated in the First
Amendment. The First Amendment mandates that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. .. ."62 In the prison context, freedom of

religion has only been a protected freedom during the last thirty years.
This section discusses the development of prisoners' free exercise of
religion and the evolution of this right that occurred between Cooper
v. Pate63 and the enactment of the RFRA.
1. Hands Off Regime-Cruz v. Beto
This section outlines the historical background of the judicial approach to prisoner free exercise claims. Traditionally, courts deferred
to Attorneys General and penal administrators and shied away from
entertaining such claims. During the 1960s however, courts gradually
became more responsive to prisoners' free exercise claims, which
opened the doors to successful free exercise suits in the following decade. 64 This section discusses the hands off regime and how it affected
all prisoners. It then discusses the effect of the hands off policy on
Jewish prisoners in particular.
a. Effect on All Prisoners
Before the 1960s, in deciding prisoners' free exercise claims, courts
rarely interfered with the judgment of prison administration.' - Courts
favored this "hands off' 66 policy because they believed that judicial
involvement would impede prison administration from implementing
penological objectives. 67 Courts were also hesitant to get involved
61. In the event of a medical emergency, however, an observant Jew is permitted
to travel in a vehicle to receive medical assistance. Neuwirth, supra note 55, § 40.50, at
651-52.
62. U.S. Const. amend. I.
63. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74 and 86-91.
65. See William L. Selke, Prisons in Crisis 28-29 (1993); Richard G. Singer & Wi!liam P. Stasky, Rights of the Imprisoned 581 (1974); see also James J. Gobert & Neil
P. Cohen, Rights Of Prisoners § 1.02, at 8-9 (1981) (discussing how during this era, the
hands off policy was predominant).
66. "The origin of the term has been attributed to Fritch, Civil Rights of Federal
Prison Inmates 31 (1961) ..... Michael Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners, § 1.02, at 7 n.22
(1993).
67. See Emily Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal,4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 219, 220 (1977) (arguing that judicial
deference arose out of respect for prison administration and their implementation of
penological objectives); see also Comment, Backwash Benefits For Second Class Citi-
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with prisoners' claims because judges believed they did not have the
expertise necessary to justify second-guessing the decisions made by
administrators. 6 During this era, inmates grew increasingly frustrated
because courts were ignoring their free exercise claims, and this frustration greatly reduced their chances of rehabilitation.6 9

In 1964, in Cooper v. Pate,70 the Supreme Court first addressed the
issue of whether prisoners have a First Amendment right of religious
freedom during their incarceration. 7 ' In Cooper, a Black Muslim was
precluded from observing his religion. 72 The plaintiff alleged that, because of his religious beliefs, prison officials denied him permission to
purchase religious books and engage in other privileges enjoyed by
other prisoners.7 3 The Supreme Court held that these claims stated a

zens: Prisoners'First Amendment And ProceduralDue Process Rights, 46 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 377, 378-79 (1975) (discussing the rationale and history of the hands off policy);
Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refiisal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506, 515-26 (1962) (same). One theory behind
the hands off policy was that courts considered prisoners to be "slaves of the state."
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871); see Ira P. Robbins, The
Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of FederalJudicial Intervention in
Prison Administration, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 211, 212-13 (1980) (discussing
the alternative theories behind the hands off doctrine); see also Kenneth C. Haas,
JudicialPolitics and CorrectionalReform: An Analysis of the "Hands-Off"Doctrine,
1977 Det. C.L. Rev. 795, 797 (same). One scholar has stated that the "judicial work
load also may have influenced judges" to invoke the hands off doctrine. Mushlin,
supra note 66, § 1.02, at 8.
68. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (per curiam)
(holding that courts do not have the authority to interfere with prison administration);
Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (stating that judicial intervention in the prison system interferes with the maintenance of discipline); see also
Mushlin, supra note 66, § 1.02, at 8 (discussing how courts deferred to the judgment of
prison administration because "management of prisons requires considerable skill,
training and experience"). Professor Mushlin, however, argues that by invalidating a
prison practice, courts are not assuming a management position. Id. Rather, they are
the experts of constitutional law which is the source of most prisoner claims. Id.
69. Mushlin, supra note 66, § 1.02, at 8 (noting that as a result of minimal judicial
pressure, there were "bitter inmates whose prospects of rehabilitation were less than
when they entered the system").
70. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
71. Id.
72. Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
73. Cooper,378 U.S. at 546. The plaintiff also alleged that he was segregated from
the rest of the prison population and deprived of his right to worship religion under
the First Amendment. Cooper, 324 F.2d at 166.
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cause of action and were subject to judicial review.7 4 Cooper, therefore, "effectively initiated the demise of the hands-off doctrine."7 5
Eight years later, in Cruz v. Beto,76 the Supreme Court once again
addressed the issue of prisoners' free exercise rights.77 Cruz, a Buddhist prisoner in a Texas prison, alleged that he was not allowed to
pray in the prison chapel or consult with religious advisors.7" Cruz
also claimed that he was placed in solitary confinement for sharing his
religious materials with other inmates. 9 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas had denied relief, holding
that "[d]ecisions in this area should be left to the sound discretion of
prison administrators.""0 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed."' The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that if
Cruz was "denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners," Texas had violated Cruz's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.'s Although
Cruz was a landmark case in that it "clearly establishe[d] that the free
exercise of religion is among those rights retained by the incarcer-

74. Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546. In stating that a prisoner had successfully alleged a
cause of action, the Court departed from the common trend of the judiciary which
favored a deferential approach to prison administration. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris, 339
F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding that the trial court had improperly interfered
with prisoner claims and discretion remained with the Attorney General); Banning v.
Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (holding that courts should
not interfere with prison administration).
75. Matthew P. Blischak, Note, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. The State of Prisoners' Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 453, 460 (1988); see Mushlin,
supra note 66, § 6.01, at 256-57 (noting that prior to Cooper,courts were applying the
hands off doctrine); Calhoun, supra note 67, at 221 (same); Religious Rights, supra
note 1, at 821 (discussing how Cooper initiated the downfall of the hands off policy).
Although religious prisoners began securing rights as of the 1960s, the hands off
doctrine continued in some form until its demise in 1974 when the Supreme Court
decided Procunierv. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
76. 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
77. Id.at 319.
78. Id79. Id.
80. Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D. Tex. 1970), affd, 445 F.2d 801 (5th
Cir. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). The District Court went on to
state that "plaintiff has failed to show prison officials have abused their wide discretion in handling prison discipline and security ....
Valid disciplinary and security
reasons... may prevent the 'equality' of exercise of religious practices in prison." Id.
The court concluded by holding that prison administration is in a better position to
determine what are valid disciplinary and security reasons. Id.
81. Cruz, 445 F.2d at 802.
82. 405 U.S. at 322. In its analysis, the Court stated that religious groups did not
have to be afforded identical privileges, but that "reasonable opportunities must be
afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments without fear of penalty." Id. at 322 n.2.
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ated, ' 83 the Court did not establish a precise standard
to govern cases
84
involving the free exercise of religious prisoners.
b.

First Amendment Rights Granted to Jewish Prisoners During the
"Hands Off" Regime

The bulk of religious prisoner cases prior to Cruz85 involved Muslim
prisoners' dietary restrictions.86 In a number of these cases, courts
used a compelling interest standard and found that Muslim prisoners
were entitled to a pork-free diet.8 7 These cases would later prove to

be beneficial to observant Jewish prisoners in their quest to obtain
kosher meals.88 The primary case involving an observant Jewish pris-

oner during this era was Konigsberg v. Ciccone.8 9 In Konigsberg, a

prison official prevented a Jewish inmate from attending religious
services because the prisoner was confined in a close control unit.90
The court elaborated on the importance of group religious service and
ordered that the prison guards escort the prisoner to the religious
services.9" Konigsberg, however, was an anomaly, as observant Jewish

prisoners were generally subject to the hands off policy being implemented by the courts throughout the country. 92
83. Religious Rights, supra note 1, at 822.
84. See Calhoun, supra note 67, at 238 ("Under both Cooper and Cruz, it is arguably unclear whether the Court will protect an inmate's First Amendment rights unless
prison officials discriminate between different classes of inmates in allowing the exercise of those rights."); see also Mushlin, supra note 66, § 6.01, at 257 (noting that Cruz
did not determine the scope of the standard to be applied to free exercise cases);
Blischak, supra note 75, at 460-61 (stating that Cruz did not delineate any specific
standard to govern prisoner cases); Religious Rights, supra note 1, at 822 ("[N]o positive scope, however, is delineated for that right."); Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 Yale
L.J. 459, 468 (1996) ("[T]he Court did not establish a clear standard for the proper
degree of scrutiny for prisoners' religious liberty cases.").
85. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
86. See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 26 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that Muslim
prisoners were not entitled to a special diet during the month-long religious observance of Ramadan); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding
that a Muslim prisoner's dietary requests should be weighed under a compelling interest test); Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1968) (holding that a
Muslim prisoner was not entitled to a special diet).
87. See, e.g., Barnett,410 F.2d at 1000-02 (evaluating the plaintiff's claims under a
compelling interest test).
88. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text (discussing successful prisoner
attempts to obtain a kosher diet).
89. 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968), afftd, 417 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1969).
90. Id. at 593. The close control unit provided protection for patients requiring
maximum control. Id. at 590 n.1.
91. Id. at 593-96. The court stated that guards should be available to bring the
prisoner to his religious services "inview of the high importance the law places on the
right to worship and the right to be free of religious discrimination." Id. at 595; see
supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
92. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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2. Prisoners' Free Exercise During the 1970s and 80s
In the fifteen years following Cruz, the Supreme Court heard numerous cases involving the First Amendment rights of prisoners and
constantly revised its approach in dealing with these claims. One
thing, however, was certain: the standards applied by the Court were
being modified in favor of the prisoners. This section provides an
overview of the major Supreme Court cases involving prisoners' First
Amendment rights decided between Cruz and Turner. This section
then discusses the rights granted to Jewish prisoners during this era.
a. Expansion of First Amendment Protection For All Prisoners

After Cruz, the Supreme Court did not decide another prisoner free
exercise case until O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz9 3 in 1987. The Court
did, however, decide numerous prisoner First Amendment cases

outside of the free exercise context which ultimately influenced the
way it would analyze free exercise cases." The Court first considered
the proper standard of review for prisoners' First Amendment claims
in Procunierv. Martinez.9 5 In Martinez, a group of prisoners chal-

lenged mail censorship regulations which applied to correspondence
between inmates and persons outside the prison.

6

The Court re-

solved to establish a fixed standard to govern First Amendment prisoner cases because the lower courts were applying inconsistent
standards in such cases.9 7 Despite its intentions, the Court focused on
93. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
94. See Abraham Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher Food, Skullcaps and Beards, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 241, 244-48 (1994) (discussing
First Amendment cases decided by the Court during this era); Blischak, supra note 75,
at 461-64 (same); Lorijean Golichowski Oei, Note, The New Standard Of Review For
Prisoners'Rights: A 'Turner' For The Worse?. 33 Viii. L. Rev. 393, 403-17 (1988)
(same).
95. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
96. Id. at 398-400.
97. Id at 406-07. The Court clearly stated that "[tihe issue before us is the appropriate standard of review for prison regulations restricting freedom of speech." Id. at
406. The Court went on to discuss the need to balance "judicial restraint" with the
protection of constitutional rights and to "formulate a standard of review for prisoner
mail censorship" in light of the inconsistency of the federal courts in deciding these
cases. Id. at 406-07.
The Court then discussed the various standards that were being used by federal
courts to decide the constitutionality of mail censorship regulations. Id. Some courts
were using a hands off policy and deferring to prison administration. See Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 973-74 (8th Cir. 1965) (upholding prison regulations limiting inmate correspondence); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964)
(stating that prisons must have "wide discretion in promulgating rules" in the interest
of prison safety). Another court required that mail censorship must be rationally related to effectively running a prison system. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding that inmate correspondence regulations should be rational and
constitutionally acceptable). At the other end of the spectrum, some courts were applying strict scrutiny and required a compelling state interest to justify prison censorship regulations. See Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding

2344

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

the free speech of the non-prisoners and held that the mail censorship
regulation was justified if the regulation furthered an important or
substantial governmental interest and the infringement was no greater
than necessary to protect that governmental interest. 98 Using this intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court found that the regulations did
not further a necessary governmental interest. 9 9 Although Martinez
was a blow to prison administration because courts would now carefully scrutinize prison regulations, ultimately the Court did not delineate an appropriate standard to govern prisoner First Amendment
claims.1 00
Two months later, in Pell v. Procunier,° the Court upheld a prison
regulation forbidding media interviews with specific inmates."02 The
Court found that by sending mail, inmates had alternative means of
communicating with the press 10 3 and "central to all other corrections
goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the
that prison regulations prohibiting minorities from receiving a newspaper of their
choice could only be permitted if supported by compelling justification); Morales v.
Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that classifying prisoners for
purposes of differential treatment is only permitted if there is a compelling state interest). There were also courts applying intermediate scrutiny to decide these cases. See
Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 896 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (holding that inmate correspondence regulations must advance some justifiable reason); Carothers v. Follette,
314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (same). Finally, other courts were using a
"clear and present danger" standard. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 672
(2d Cir. 1972) (holding that censorship regulations are permitted only when there is
"'clear and present danger' to the facility's security").
98. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. This standard is known as intermediate scrutiny and
is applied to time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in public fora. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (enunciating an intermediate level of
scrutiny).
99. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 415. The prison administration claimed that the mail
regulations were instituted to prevent inmate rioting. Id. at 416. The Court found that
the warden could not show how permitting inmates to send mail would lead to flash
riots. Id. The Court did, however, discuss the importance of deferring to prison authorities when it comes to evaluating prison regulations. Id. at 404-05. "Suffice it to
say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to
the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree." Id.
100. The Court expressly reserved the question of the proper standard of review to
apply in cases involving questions of prisoner rights. Id. at 409; see Mushlin, supra
note 66, § 5.01, at 216 (noting that the Court "sidestepped" the question of prisoners'
free speech rights); Joseph C. Hutchinson, Analyzing The Religious Free Exercise
Rights of Inmates: The Significance of Pell, Jones, and Wolfish, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 413, 430 (1982-83) (stating that the Supreme Court in Martinez failed to
set a standard to govern prisoner claims). It is important to note that three concurring justices discussed the rights of prisoners and emphasized the need to protect their
First Amendment rights. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 422-28 (Marshall, Brennan, JJ., concurring); id. at 428-29 (Douglas, J., concurring); see Abramovsky, supra note 94, at 245
(analyzing the concurring opinions).
101. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
102. Id. at 828. The prison prohibited face to face interviews between press representatives and individual inmates who were specifically requested for interviews. Id.
at 819.
103. Id. at 828 n.5.
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The standard used in Pell was

similar to Martinez, in that both holdings required that prisons show
that the regulation in question furthered an important or substantial
governmental interest. 105 In contrast to Martinez, however, the Pelt
court did not apply the second prong of the Martinez test requiring
that a regulation limiting First Amendment freedoms be no greater
than necessary to achieve the governmental interest involved."' All
in all, the standard used in Pell was akin to low-level scrutiny."0 7
In Bell v. Wolfish," 8 the Supreme Court followed its holding in Pell
and applied a deferential standard of scrutiny when evaluating a decision of prison administration in the First Amendment context.", Bell
involved a prison regulation which prohibited prisoners from receiving hard cover books unless the books were mailed directly from publishers or bookclubs." 0 The Court concluded that the restriction did
not violate the First Amendment rights of the inmates, because the
"limited restriction is a rational response by prison officials to an obvious security problem." ' In addition, the Court held that the restriction operated in a neutral manner, without regard to the content of
the books and, further, that the alternative means of obtaining reading
material was not burdensome." 2 Following Bell, the Supreme Court
continued to defer to prison administration." 3
104. Id at 823.
105. See Gobert & Cohen, supra note 65, § 4.02. at 106-07 (comparing Martinez and
Pell).
106. Id at 106.
107. See Oei, supra note 94, at 413 (stating that in Pell, the Court applied the rational relationship standard to govern the prisoner's First Amendment claim). Low
level scrutiny means that a court will uphold a law if it has a "rational relation" to a
"legitimate governmental purpose." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993) (holding that involuntary commitment of mentally retarded individuals did not violate
equal protection or due process).
108. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
109. Id. at 550-51.
110. Id. at 528.
111. Id. at 550. The Court went on to explain that the hard cover books could
easily be used to smuggle contraband such as drugs and weapons into the institution.
Id. at 550-51. The Court referred to Pell and Martinez, which discussed the importance of deference towards prison management. Id. at 548. "Such considerations are
peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and,
in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have
exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to
their expert judgment in such matters." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
112. Bell, 441 U.S. at 551-52. The inmates in Bell had the privilege of obtaining
soft-cover books from any source and also had access to the "relatively large" library
at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. Id. at 552.
113. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984) (upholding contact visitation
regulations because "experienced administrators" are more capable than courts at establishing prison regulations); Beltran v. Smith, 458 U.S. 1303, 1305 (1982) (holding
that the design of security and safety regulations belong within the domain of the
Attorney General and that courts are not justified in interfering with the prisons'
judgment); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (holding that structural con-
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Although the Supreme Court decided several prisoner First
Amendment cases, the Court did not establish a bright line standard
to govern these claims. As a result, the circuit courts ruling on free
exercise claims acted without guidance from the Supreme Court and
utilized various formulations of First Amendment legal standards." 4
Some circuits used a compelling interest approach that gave prisoners
the same protection to which free persons were entitled. 15 Other circuits used the Martinez standard, 1 6 which upheld prison regulations
only if there was a substantial or important interest and the restriction7
was no greater than necessary to meet the governmental interest."
The Eighth Circuit, in similar fashion to post-Martinez Supreme Court
cases, 11 8 was more deferential to prison management and upheld regulations if the prison officials' actions were related to the safety and
security of the prison. "1 9 The Third' and Fourth Circuits' 2 1 enacted
standards that "synthesize[d]
the Supreme Court's decisions in Marti22
nez. Pell, Jones and Bell.'
siderations of a prison are properly "weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court").
114. See Mushlin, supra note 66, § 6.01, at 257 (stating that because the Court had
not established a clear standard, "lower courts developed a number of contradictory
tests to resolve these cases"); Blischak, supra note 75, at 467-71 (discussing the various standards that were being implemented by the various federal circuit courts); Oci,
supra note 94, at 414 (noting that the circuit courts were applying "divergent standards of review"); Solove, supra note 84, at 468-69 (noting that lower courts were
applying different levels of review to decide prisoner complaints).
115. See Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d 1057, 1061 (10th Cir. 1976) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)). "If it is determined that the practice of a
religious belief is involved, and that there are restrictions imposed on its exercise,
then the court should further determine whether [the regulation] is justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation of prison affairs, within the State's constitutional powers." Id.; see also Weaver v. Jago, 675 F.2d 116, 119 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding
that only interests of the highest order can overcome the legitimate claim of free
exercise of religion).
116. See supra text accompanying note 98.
117. See Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "we believe
that the intermediate scrutiny standard expressed in ...Martinez controls" (citation
omitted)); Vodicka v. Phelps, 624 F.2d 569, 570 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Martinez standard is the appropriate standard to evaluate prisoner First Amendment
claims).
118. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
119. See Little v. Norris, 787 F.2d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Prison officials are
given a wide range of discretion in dealing with security matters in the prisons.");
Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir. 1982) ("A wide range of discretion must
be allowed the officials to deal with security matters.").
120. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 419-20 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 342
(1987).
121- Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (4th Cir. 1986).
122. Oei, supra note 94, at 415 n.99. In Vester, the Fourth Circuit articulated a twostep standard of review which was developed from Martinez, Pell, Jones, and Bell.
Vester, 795 F.2d at 1182-83. The court stated that if a non-prisoner's First Amendment
rights were affected or a prisoner's First Amendment rights were totally denied, then
the prison would have to satisfy a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 1182. Where a prison
merely limits a prisoner's First Amendment rights, judicial deference should be ac-
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established the

most innovative approach to decide a prisoner's First Amendment

claims. In Wali, a prison inmate sought to enjoin prison officials from
censoring a publication entitled "Attica: A Report on Conditions,

1983. " 124 The Second Circuit formulated a "tripartite standard" to de-

termine if there had been a violation of the prisoner's First Amendment rights."2 The court used the following factors to determine how
the standard should be applied: (a) the nature of the right asserted by
the prisoner; (b) the type of activity in which the prisoner sought to
engage; and (c) whether the restriction merely limits or effectively denies exercise of that right."
The court stated that where a right is held to be "inherently inconsistent with proper penological objectives," 127 such as the right to
travel,"2 there is no invasion of the purported right and "judicial deference should be nearly absolute.' 12 The second part of the standard
stated that, where inmates seek to engage in an activity that is "presumptively dangerous, deference to the judgment of correction officials should be extremely broad, though not categorical."' 3 Under
this standard, the burden shifts to the prisoner to show that the restriction cannot be reasonably justified.'
A third application of the standard will apply when an activity is not presumptively dangerous and
the regulation totally deprives the inmate of exercising a protected

right.132 In these limited circumstances, prison officials bear the burden of showing that the restriction furthers an important governmencorded to prison administration and courts should apply low level scrutiny to the prisoner's claims. Id at 1183.
123. 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985). For a thorough analysis of Wali, see Abramovsky, supra note 94, at 246-47; Oei, supra note 94, at 415-17.
124. Wali, 754 F.2d at 1020-21.
125. Id. at 1033.
126. Id. Prior to discussing the tripartite standard, the court stated that institutional security is the central goal of a penal institution, courts have properly given
great deference to prison administration, and "[tihe difficult task lies in determining
the degree of deference to be accorded in a given setting." Id.
127. Id; see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119,
125-26 (1977) (holding that certain rights are incompatible with penological
objectives).
128. See Gobert & Cohen, supra note 65, § 4.02, at 102 (noting that freedom to
travel is inconsistent with incarceration).
129. Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
130. Id.; see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1984) (holding that
contact visits are presumptively dangerous).
131. Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033. The court continued to stress the importance of deferring to the decisions of the trained professionals who enacted these regulations. Id.
It would be too easy for us to substitute our judgment for those of trained
professionals with years of firsthand experience. But where a regulation or
practice does no more than define the "time, place or manner" in which
prisoners may enjoy a protected right, we must avoid the temptation to do
SO.
Id_
132. Id
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tal interest and the restrictions on the prisoners' rights are no 1greater
33
than necessary to further the governmental interest involved.
In Wali, the court applied the third part of the standard because 34
it
found that reading is beneficial and is not presumptively dangerous.
The warden therefore, had the burden of showing that the regulation
served an important interest and 1was
no more restrictive than neces35
sary, which he was unable to do.
b.

Application of Stricter Scrutiny to Jewish Prisoners' Free
Exercise Claims

During the fifteen year span between Cruz and Turner, observant
Jewish prisoners were victorious in many cases involving the free exercise of religion.' 3 6 In particular, Jewish prisoners were generally successful in procuring a strict kosher diet. 1 37 For example, in United
States v. Kahane,138 the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York held that a Jewish prisoner is "constitutionally entitled to an order accompanying his sentence that allows him to conform to Jewish
1' 39
dietary laws.'
The pro-inmate trend continued in Prushinowski v. Hambrick.4 '
In Prushinowski, a Jewish inmate alleged that he suffered severe
health problems due to poor nutrition resulting from not being provided a kosher diet.' 4 ' The court held that prison authorities must
provide a diet to prisoners which is consistent with their religious beliefs.' 4 2 In addition, "the burden falls on the prison officials to prove
that the food available to a religious inmate is consistent with his diet43
ary laws and provides adequate nourishment.'
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1034.
135. Id. at 1036.
136. See Eric J. Zogry, Comment, Orthodox Jewish Prisonersand the Turner Effect,
56 La. L. Rev. 905, 908 (1996). Courts found that "incarceration does not relieve
[religious obligations]." United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 692 (E.D.N.Y.)
aff'd sub. nom., Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
137. See Abramovsky, supra note 94, at 265.
138. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687.
139. Id. at 704. Interestingly enough, only two weeks prior to Kahane, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York decided a case similar to Kahane and
reached the opposite conclusion. See United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Huss, the court held that the prisoner had the burden of proving
that deprivation of kosher food was clearly unreasonable. Id. at 762. Further, the

court considered the additional costs of kosher food and the potential for inmate jealousy as sufficient grounds for not requiring the prison to provide a kosher diet. Id.
For a thorough critique of Huss, see Abramovsky, supra note 94, at 266-69.
140. 570 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
141. Id. at 864.
142. Id. at 866.
143. Id. The prison authorities argued that Prushinowski's religious beliefs were
extreme and the prison should only have to provide food that would be deemed acceptable to most observant Jews. Id. at 867. The court however, held that Prushinowski's beliefs was the relevant inquiry. Id.; see Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp.
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In the years leading up to Turner, most courts found that prisons
were required to provide kosher food to Jewish inmates.'" These
courts held that so long as the requests were reasonable, prisoners
would be entitled to receive a kosher diet. 4 s In addition, during this
era, Konigsberg"4 was followed in Wilson v.Beame, 47 where the
court held that a Jewish prisoner was entitled to pray with a group of
other Jewish inmates because "communal worship seems a hallmark
of organized religion." '1 Finally, courts scrutinized other prison regulations that infringed on Jewish beliefs and, in many cases, found in
favor of the prisoner.'49
3. Free Exercise Under the Turner Standard
During the fifteen years after Cruz, the Supreme Court had not delineated one clear standard to govern prisoners' First Amendment
claims. In Turner v. Safley, 50 the Court established a four part test to
govern these claims. One week later, the Court applied this four part
test to a prisoner's free exercise claim in O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz.15 ' This would prove to be the governing standard over the
next six years. This section examines the seminal cases of Turner and
O'Lone and then discusses their effects on Jewish prisoners.
a. Turner v. Safley and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz
In 1987, the Supreme Court, finally established a bright-line standard to determine the reasonableness of a prison regulation in Turner
947, 949 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding that although many Orthodox Jews shave their
beards, plaintiff "need not show that his religious practice is absolutely mandated in

order to receive constitutional protection"). The court also stated that there were no
potential economic problems to the prison, because the kosher food was being

donated by the Jewish community. Prushzinowski, 570 F. Supp. at 868.
144. See, e.g., Prushinowski, 570 F. Supp. at 866; Kahane, 396 F. Supp. at 704; see
also Zogry, supra note 136, at 912 (discussing the trend in courts' evaluations of ko-

sher claims prior to Turner).
145. Zogry, supra note 136, at 912. Not all courts however, were granting inmates

kosher food. See, e.g., United States v. Shlian, 396 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (E.D.N.Y.
1975) (denying the plaintiffs request to receive a kosher diet in accordance with his
religious beliefs).
146. 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1969). See
supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of Konigsberg.
147. 380 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).

148. Id at 1239.
149. See, e.g., Goulden v. Oliver, 442 U.S. 922, 923 (1979) (noting that many circuit
courts have held grooming regulations to be unconstitutional); Fromer v. Scully, 817
F.2d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a beard length restriction was unconstitutional); Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp. 947, 951 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding that a
prison regulation prohibiting beards was unconstitutional). But see Maimon v. Wainwright, 792 F.2d 133, 133 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that a prison can regulate grooming procedures).
150. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
151. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
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v. Safley. 152 In Turner, an inmate challenged regulations which re153
stricted inmate correspondence and marriage within the prison.
The Court began by noting that the task at hand, as in Martinez, was
to balance prisoners' constitutional rights against the policy of judicial
restraint in such matters. 154 The Court reviewed its holdings in postMartinez cases, each of which required that prison officials' decisions
be rationally related to legitimate penological interests such as safety
and security. 155 The Court also stated that its task was to establish5 a6
First Amendment claims.'

clear standard of review for prisoner
Consequently, the Court enunciated the following standard: "[W]hen
a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is1' valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
57
interests.'

Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, went on to enunciate
four factors that are relevant in determining whether a regulation is
reasonable.' 58 The first factor considers whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation and the governmental interest.'59 A second factor is whether there are alternative means

available to the inmate which would permit him to exercise his religious beliefs.1 60 The third factor considers the impact that an accommodation to the prisoner would have on the guards, other inmates,
and the institution in general.16 ' Finally, the fourth factor takes into
152. 482 U.S. at 89-90.
153. Id. at 81-82. The correspondence regulation restricted inmates from corresponding with inmates at other institutions unless the letters were being sent to close
family members or pertained to legal matters, Id. at 81. The marriage regulation rcstricted prisoners from marrying unless they had the permission of the prison superintendent and provided that there were compelling reasons to do so. Id. at 82.
154. 1l at 85.

155. Id. at 86-87. The Court discussed Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North CarolinaPrisons' Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); and Pell v. Procunier,417 U.S. 817 (1974). Turner, 482 U.S.
at 87. The Court emphasized that: "In none of these four ...cases did the Court
apply a standard of heightened scrutiny, but instead inquired whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is 'reasonably related' to legitimate penological
objectives or whether it represents an 'exaggerated response' to those concerns." Id.
In addition, the Court stated that although most First Amendment claims are decided
using a strict scrutiny standard, "[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to
anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration." Id. at 89.
156. Id. at 85.

157. Id. at 89.
158. Id. at 89-91.
159. Id. at 89 (quoting Block, 468 U.S. at 586). The Court explained that a regulation would not be reasonable if the relation between the goal and regulation would be
so remote as to render it arbitrary or irrational. Id. at 89-90.
160. Id. at 90.
161. Id. "When accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant 'ripple
effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to
the informed discretion of corrections officials." Id.
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account that the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of reasonable regulations, meaning that "the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable." ' 2
Applying these four factors, the Court, by a 5-4 majority, held that the
regulation on inmate correspondence was reasonable,6 3 but that the re-

striction on inmate marriages was unconstitutional.1
One week after Turner, the Supreme Court applied the Turner factors in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,164 which dealt with prisoners' free
exercise rights. In O'Lone, Muslim prisoners challenged prison regulations that prevented them from attending religious services."' 5 The
Court found that the prison officials had acted appropriately because
the regulation was reasonably related to the valid penological interest
of maintaining security." In addition, special treatment to Muslim
prisoners would create dissent among other inmates. 6 7 The Court
also found that the prisoners could express their religious beliefs in
alternative ways without jeopardizing prison security." Finally, the
Court concluded that the prison did not have to prove that alternative
means of enforcing this prison policy were unavailable. 6 9
Thus, Turner and O'Lone clarified the Supreme Court's views on
prisoners' First Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise.
According to the Court, the appropriate standard to govern these
cases was one of extreme deference to prison administration. 7 Dur-

ing the five years between Turner/O'Lone and the RFRA, federal
162. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that a prisoner would be able to prove that the
regulation is unreasonable if he can point to an alternative which would impose only a
de minimis cost on the penological objective. Id. at 90-91.
163. Id. at 91. Justice Stevens suggested that the standard enacted by the majority
was too deferential to prison administration and the Court should have adopted the
Wali approach. Id at 101 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reasoning that Wali is "a more careful attempt to strike a fair balance between legitimate penological concerns and the well-settled proposition that inmates do not give
up all constitutional rights by virtue of incarceration"). Id.
164. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). For a thorough discussion of O'Lone, see Mushlin, supra
note 66, § 6.02, at 259-71.
165. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 345. In O'Lone, a prison adopted a policy which prohibited inmates assigned to outside work detail from returning to the prison during the
day unless there was an emergency situation. Id. at 347. The regulation had the effect
of preventing Muslim prisoners assigned to outside work from participating in religious services which took place during the day. Id.
166. Id. at 350.
167. Id. at 352-53.
168. Id at 352. The Court observed that the prisoners were free to pray at any time
other than during working hours, could arrange a pork-free diet, and that special dietary arrangements were made during the month long period of Ramadan. hL
169. Id. at 353.
170. See Solove, supra note 84, at 470 ("[T]he Court crystallized the degree of scrutiny at the lowest level that courts had been using-a scrutiny so meager and deferential that it approximated the 'hands off' doctrine."); Zogry, supra note 136, at 920
("The new four-factor test places the burden of proof on the prisoner, whereas in
earlier cases the courts required the prison to explain why its regulation was
constitutional.").
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courts throughout the country applied the Turner factors to prisoners'
religious exercise cases.171 When applying the Turner standard, courts
almost always 72found that restrictions on religious practice were
constitutional.a
b.

The Turner Era and its Effect on Jewish Prisoners

The impact of Turner and O'Lone were felt by all religious prisoners, including observant Jews. 17 3 Although Jewish prisoners retained

some pre-Turner rights, many courts employed the low level scrutiny
of Turner and O'Lone,
which resulted in the curtailment of prisoners'
1 74
exercise of religion.

In cases involving inmate petitions for kosher food, most courts
respected these requests, although courts' reasoning for the decisions
differed. For example, in Bass v. Coughlin,175 the Second Circuit held
that a Jewish prisoner must be provided a kosher diet based on
Kahane, which had not been overruled by Turner or O'Lone.176 The
court stated that Turner and O'Lone did not apply because those cases

involved inmate correspondence and prayer, whereas Bass involved
dietary restrictions. 177 Other courts, however, found that the right to
be provided kosher food was not an absolute right.' 78 In Cooper v.
Rogers, 79 for example, a Jewish prisoner who had been provided kosher meals for lunch and dinner alleged that his constitutional rights
were violated because he could not secure kosher food for the break171. See Mark v. Nix, 983 F.2d 138, 139 (8th Cir. 1993) (restriction against wearing
a hard plastic crucifix was upheld because it could be used as a weapon); Powell v.
Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 26 (5th Cir. 1992) (prohibition against long hair and facial hair
upheld using a "rationally related" standard); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F. Supp. 570,
574-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (upholding restrictions that prevented Rastafarian inmates
from wearing religious crowns); Bunny v. Coughlin, 593 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (App. Div.
1993) (same).
172. See Zogry, supra note 136, at 926-27. As Zogry comments, "With the heavy
burden on the prisoner to show that his rights had been greatly circumscribed, the
courts were reluctant to find constitutional violations." Id. at 927.
173. See Abramovsky, supra note 94, at 272 ("[Rjeligious Jewish prisoners have
been faced with an increasingly difficult struggle to secure their religious rights.");
Solove, supra note 84, at 470 (stating that Turner merely reinforced the low level
scrutiny that the courts had been applying to prisoner claims); Zogry, supra note 136.
at 920-26 (discussing how Turner affected Orthodox Jewish prisoners).
174. Zogry, supra note 136, at 926.
175. 976 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1992).
176. Id. at 99.
177. Id.; see also McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that
"Inmates also have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in
good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion."); Ross v. Coughlin, 669 F.
Supp. 1235, 1241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that where a Jewish prisoner alleged
that he was deprived of a kosher diet, he had stated a cause of action). Both the Ross
and Mcelyea courts held that a prisoner has a right to a kosher diet even though
Turner had been decided merely just a few weeks earlier.
178. See, e.g., Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that prisons
need not respond to particular dietary requests).
179. 788 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991).
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fast meal.'8 0 The court applied the Turner factors and held that the
additional cost of kosher food alone was sufficient to find the prison

regulation reasonable.'
Courts were also reaching different conclusions in cases involving
the right of communal prayer. In Whitney v. Brown, ' the Sixth Circuit held that a prison regulation which eliminated intercomplex travel
by Jewish inmates, preventing them from going to weekly Sabbath
services, was an infringement on the free exercise of religion."' In

reaching its conclusion, the Court employed a Turner analysis and
found that the asserted governmental interest of safety did not outweigh the prisoner's religious rights." 4
In Garza v. Carlson,"5 however, the Eighth Circuit decided in favor
of prison administration when a Jewish inmate was prohibited from
praying with a quorum of ten Jewish men while he was in administrative segregation. 86 The court relied on O'Lone to find that the prison
regulation against the plaintiff was reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. 8 7 The court also found that the right to free
exercise in prison is not absolute, and refused to interfere with "the
difficult and sensitive task of prison authorities in regulating the conduct of prisoners...."
Claims involving Jewish inmates' religious obligation to observe
Sabbath were likewise receiving widely disparate treatment from the
courts of this era. In Ward v. Walsh, 8 9 a Jewish inmate asked for an
injunction to prevent the prison from transporting him to another fa-

180. Id at 256.
181. Id at 260. But see Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 86S-69
(E.D.N.C. 1983) (stating that "budgetary considerations alone cannot excuse the
prison from according Prushinowski his First Amendment rights"). There were other
courts that applied the Turner factors to determine whether a Jewish inmate was entitled to kosher meals. See Ben-Avraham v. Moses, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611 (9th
Cir. July 19, 1993) (holding that under the Turner analysis, the prison acted reasonably
by not providing the plaintiff with a kosher diet); Ward v. Walsh. 1 F.3d 873, 876-79
(9th Cir. 1993) (applying the Turner factors and remanding the case with instructions
to obtain the facts to help analyze two of the Turner factors). In Ward, the court
recognized the distinction between requiring a believer to defile himself by doing
something which is forbidden as opposed to curtailing various ways of expressing beliefs for which alternatives exist. Id.
182. 882 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1989).
183. Id. at 1078. The court also found that the six Jewish inmates were entitled to
have a group Passover meal once a year. Id. at 1074.
184. Id. at 1074-78.
185. 877 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1989).
186. Id. at 15.
187. Id. at 16-17. The prison contended that the regulation was necessary as a matter of institutional security concern. Id.
188. Id. at 17; see also Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 741 (W.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding that "[t]he right to attend congregate religious services is not absolute"). The court in Nolley went on to state that O'Lone should be followed in cases
where there are serious security reasons for depriving an inmate of congregate services. Id. at 741-42.
189. 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
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cility on any Sabbath or holiday. 190 The court applied the Turner fac-

tors and held that legitimate security concerns justified the prison
policy of transporting prisoners whenever necessary, regardless of
whether it was Sabbath or a Jewish holiday. 19' The court also found
that the inmate could practice his religion on most Sabbaths and, further, that special accommodations would have an adverse impact on
the prison as a whole.' 92 Therefore, the Turner factors weighed in
favor of the prison and the plaintiff was prevented from exercising his
religious beliefs.'9 3

A contrary decision was reached in Young v. Lane,194 where the
District court in the Northern District of Illinois acknowledged the
importance of a Jewish inmate refraining from work on Sabbath and
the court submitted guidelines to the prison to help it meet this
goal.' 95 Among numerous other guidelines, the court submitted the
following instruction: "Jewish religious holidays and the Sabbath shall
be scheduled on the regular prison calendar."' 9 6

Although many prisons allowed inmates to wear yarmulkes,197 the
Seventh Circuit, in Young v. Lane,198 upheld a prison directive which
limited the wearing of yarmulkes to prison cells and religious services. 199 The Court of Appeals relied on several arguments to find that
the regulation prohibiting yarmulkes outside the prison cell should 2be°°
upheld. First, the court held that, under Goldman v. Weinberger,

190. Id. at 879.
191. Id. at 880.
192. Id. The court also held that Ward had an alternative means of exercising his
religion despite the prison policy of transporting prisoners when necessary. Id. The
court's statement that Ward had alternative means of practicing his religion belies the
court's misunderstanding of the concept of Sabbath. It is incorrect to assume that
observing one Sabbath can compensate for violating another Sabbath because each
Sabbath should be viewed independently of another. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbath
64b. Commentators have noted that, in applying Turner, many courts misunderstood
claims of religious inmates and, as a result, improperly concluded that there were
alternative means to practice religion. See Abramovsky, supra note 94, at 243 (stating
that "religious problems encountered by Jewish prisoners stem at least in part from
the inability or unwillingness of a number of courts to carefully consider the religious
and historical bases for Jewish religious practices."); Solove, supra note 84, at 475-79
(arguing that courts have been insensitive towards religious beliefs, and have also
been too deferential to prison administration).
193. Ward, 1 F.3d at 880.
194. 733 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd, 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991).
195. Id. at 1211-12.
196. Id. at 1212.
197. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F. Supp. 570, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating
that wearing a yarmulke is less of a security risk than other religious forms of
headgear).
198. 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991).
199. Id. at 376. The religious obligation to wear a yarmulke at all times would
require a Jewish inmate to wear a yarmulke to meals and other prison activities which
take place outside the prison cell. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
200. 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. In Weinberger, the Supreme Court held that the military could enact a dress code which pro-
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the government may prescribe dress code regulations.20° The court
also stated that by restricting yarmulkes outside the prison cells,
prison administration would be preventing prisoners from smuggling
contraband underneath the yarmulkes, and prison gangs from identifying other gangs.2 2
Other courts have acknowledged that yarmulkes do not possess a
security risk to penal administration because yarmulkes are small and
fit snugly on the skull. For instance, in Benjamin v. Coughlin,"°3 a
Rastafarian inmate challenged a restriction against wearing a religious
crown in prison.' 4 The court applied the Turner factors and found
that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing that the restriction against wearing the Rastafarian crown violated their constitutional rights.2 " As part of its analysis, the court distinguished
yarmulkes from the Rastafarian crowns by stating that "yarmulkes...
are smaller and fit closely to the head" and possess less of a security
risk than the crowns.20 6

The above cases illustrate the confusion which existed after the Turner decision but prior to the enactment of the RFRA. One thing was
clear, however: the burden which, prior to Turner, was on prison administration had been shifted to the prisoner. After Turner, prison
regulations were presumptively valid provided they were justified by
any legitimate penological interest.20 7
II.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION

AcT

Free exercise has always been an integral part of the American experience. As the twentieth century progressed, the Supreme Court
evaluated Free Exercise cases with greater levels of scrutiny, culminating with Sherbert v. Verner,2 "8 in which the Supreme Court used a
compelling interest standard to evaluate a free exercise claim. 209 The
compelling interest standard survived for almost thirty years before
hibited any type of religious wear. 475 U.S. at 509-10. This regulation effectively
prevented the plaintiff from wearing a yarmulke while on duty. Id. at 504.
201. Young, 922 F.2d at 375-76. Professor Abramovsky argues that Weinberger has
been read to apply only to military cases, not to all government organizations.
Abramovsky, supra note 94, at 261.
202. Young, 922 F.2d at 375-76. It should be noted, however, that the prison did
not prohibit the wearing of baseball caps throughout the prison. Id. at 375.
203. 708 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
204. Id. at 571. A Rastafarian crown is part of Rastafarian tradition and is used to
"keep impurities from the dreadlocks, to shield them from the eyes of non-Rastafarians, and to keep the curious from touching them." Id. at 574.
205. Id. at 574-75.
206. Id at 574; see also Bunny v. Coughlin, 593 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (App. Div. 1993)

(stating that yarmulkes rightfully are less of a security concern because of their tight
fit).
207. See Zogry, supra note 136, at 932-33 (discussing that after Turner, courts failed
to protect prisoners' obligatory religious practices).
208. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
209. Id. at 406.
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the Court decided the seminal case of Employment Division v.
Smith ,21° in which the Court applied low-level scrutiny to a regulation
which burdened religion. 211 In response to Smith, Congress passed
the RFRA with widespread bipartisan support and the approval of
nearly all religious groups throughout the country. The passage of the
RFRA essentially returned the compelling interest standard to all free
exercise cases, including those brought by prisoners. The relief of religious groups was short-lived however, because, the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress had exceeded its constitutional power by enacting
the RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores.2" 2 Thus, the RFRA was struck
down as unconstitutional. 1 3 This part discusses the Supreme Court's
treatment of free exercise cases over the last thirty years. This part
then reviews the congressional debates surrounding the passage of the
RFRA and the controversial Reid Amendment. Finally, this part concludes with the Supreme Court's treatment of the RFRA in City of
Boerne v. Flores and briefly discusses its impact on prisoners' right to
free exercise.
A. Introduction to the RFRA
This section traces the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause
over the last thirty years, which ultimately led to the enactment of the
RFRA. Next, this section discusses the House and Senate hearings
during which the RFRA was debated. The primary concern of many
legislators was the impact that the RFRA would have on prison litigation and penal administration. Accordingly, many politicians wanted
to create a special prisoner exemption in the language of the RFRA.
Finally, this section discusses the legislative intent behind the RFRA
and how it affected the O'Lone standard.
1. Impetus of the RFRA
The Supreme Court first enunciated a compelling interest standard
for a free exercise claim in Sherbert v. Verner.214 In Sherbert, South
Carolina had denied unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who was fired from her job for refusing to work on her Sabbath.2" 5 The Court held that South Carolina's asserted interest in
deterring "unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work" did not satisfy a compelling interest and substantially
burdened the free exercise of religion.21 6
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 878-90.
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
Id. at 2172.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 407.
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The Court again applied the compelling interest standard in Wisconsin v. Yoder.21 7 In Yoder, the State of Wisconsin convicted three
Amish parents who refused to send their children to post-elementary
level schools. 2 18 The Court found that Wisconsin's asserted interest in
preparing self-reliant citizens for participation in society was not compelling and did not outweigh the free exercise of the Amish parents. 21 9
The Court began to chip away at the compelling interest standard in
Goldman v. Weinberger.'22 In Goldman, an observant Jew, challenged
an Air Force regulation prohibiting him from wearing a yarmulke
while on duty."' The Court acknowledged that the military community was unique, and, thus refused to apply the compelling interest
standard established in Sherbert and reinforced in Yoder.m Instead,
the Court applied low-level scrutiny and held that the regulation was
reasonably related to the Air Force's purpose of subordinating personal preferences in favor of the group's mission. '
Finally, in 1990, the Court effectively overruled the compelling interest standard when it decided Employment Division v. Smith. 22 In
Smith, two rehabilitation drug counselors were fired from their jobs
225
because they admitted ingesting peyote during a religious service.
Under Oregon law, it was criminal to ingest peyote for any purpose. " 6
As a result, the two employees were denied unemployment compensation, as the Employment Division determined that the employees
had been discharged for "work-related 'misconduct."" 7 The Court
held that the Oregon laws prohibited ingestion of peyote, even for
religious purposes, and a neutral law of general applicability that effectively burdens religion need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest.22s
217. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
218. Id. at 207-08.
219. Id. at 221-22.
220. 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see Ira C. Lupu, Of Tmne and the RFRA: A Lawyer's
Guide to the Religious Freedon Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L Rev. 171, 182-85 (1995)
(noting the subtle changes in the Sherbertstandard which eventually led to the demise
of the compelling interest standard); Mary A. Schnabel, Note, The Religious Freedom
Restoration AcL" A Prison'sDilemma, 29 Williamette L. Rev. 323, 328-30 (1993) (discussing the downfall of the compelling interest standard).
221. Weinberger, 475 U.S. at 504.
222. Id. at 507-10.

223. Id. at 510. The Court espoused the virtues of teamwork and its importance in
the military context. Id. at 508. "Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by
tending to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those of rank....
[T]he necessary habits of discipline and unity must be developed in advance of
trouble." Id.
224. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

225. Id. at 874.
226. Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) (1987).
227. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.

228. Id. at 878-90.
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The RFRA was proposed as "a direct legislative response to the
Smith decision. ' 229 The stated purpose of the RFRA is "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner ... and...

Yoder... and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened
by government. '230 The RFRA restored the compelling interest test
that was used in pre-Smith cases by stating: "[G]overnments should
not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification . .. ,,~aWith strong bipartisan support and the backing of a
broad range of religious groups, 2 the RFRA was passed by Congress2 3 and signed into law on November 17, 1993. 23
2.

The Debate Surrounding the Prisoner Exemption

The applicability of the compelling interest standard to religious
prisoners was the "most hotly debated aspect" of the RFRA's enactment. 23 5 Correctional officials throughout the country and twentyfour Attorneys General lobbied to exempt prisoners from the
RFRA .236 Prison officials were concerned that without a prisoner exemption, "[t]his bill will have a devastating affect on prison safety and
229. Schnabel, supra note 220, at 336; see also Abbot Cooper, Comment, Dam the
RFRA at the Prison Gate: The Religious Freedom RestorationAct's Impact on CorrectionalLitigation, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 325, 332 (1995) (noting that the RFRA was enacted
as a measure against Smith); Solove, supra note 84, at 470 (noting that Congress "created RFRA in response to Smith"); Zogry, supra note 136, at 933 (stating that the
RFRA originated with the Smith decision). For discussions critical of the Smith decision, see John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise
Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 71 (1991); James D. Gordon
III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109
(1990).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
231. Id. § 2000bb(a)(3). The RFRA also contained additional findings:
[I]n Employment Division v. Smith,. . . the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and ... the compelling interest
test set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.
Id. § 2000bb(a)(4)-(5).
232. The coalition of religious groups was known as the "Coalition for the Free
Exercise of Religion." 139 Cong. Rec. S14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Hatch). This group was comprised of over 50 religious organizations. Id.
233. The Act was voted on in the Senate and was approved by a 97-3 majority. 139
Cong. Rec. S14,470-71 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993). In the House of Representatives, the
Act passed with a voice vote. 139 Cong. Rec. H2363 (daily ed. May 11, 1993).
234. Cooper, supra note 229, at 325.
235. Solove, supra note 84, at 471.
236. See Mark Hansen, Religious Freedom Worries AGs, 80 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at
20 (noting that correctional officials throughout the country lobbied for a prisoner
exemption in the RFRA).
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security at an enormous fiscal price."' 7 In addition, advocates of a
prisoner exemption argued that if the RFRA applied to prisoners,
there would be a "dramatic increase in the amount of cost and litigation" of prisoner claims and would be harmful overall to penal administration. 23 8 Senator Reid of Nevada responded to these concerns by
introducing the Reid Amendment, which would have exempted prison
regulations from having to meet the compelling interest standard of
the RFRA.239
Senator Reid's amendment did not go unopposed. It was contested
by a tremendous coalition of religious groups, Attorneys General, and
fellow Senators.2 4 Senator Edward Kennedy argued that by encouraging prisoners to seek religion, there would be a greater likelihood of
rehabilitation.2 4 ' Senator Kennedy also read letters from the United
States Attorney General, Janet Reno, and thirteen State Attorneys
General who signed a letter expressing opposition to the Reid
Amendment.2 4 2 The letter from the Attorneys General was written
by Robert Abrams, the Attorney General of New York, who stated:
"Based on past experience with RFRA's legal standard, the bill will
neither jeopardize prison security nor produce significant increases in
costs .... In New York, for example, only 1% of all [prisoner] cases
237. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,355 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Reid).
Senator Simpson was Senator Reid's co-sponsor of the amendment. IL at S14,353.
He argued that without a prisoner exemption, there would be an increase in prisoner
litigation, and constant judicial intervention into prison management. He instead suggested that O'Lone was the proper standard for prisoner free exercise claims because
it recognizes the necessary limits of prisoners' rights. See id. at S14-360-61 (statement
of Sen. Simpson).
238. Id. at S14,355 (statement of Sen. Reid) (quoting a letter sent from all 50 State
prison directors and 24 Attorneys General). Correctional officials had many other
concerns, including the fear that inmates would pick fights with other prisoners who
were perceived as receiving special treatment. Hansen, supra note 236, at 20. Others
worried that "hate groups [would] engage in racist conduct under the guise of religion." Id Another scholar has suggested that the RFRA would actually curtail prisoners' religious freedom rights by forcing courts to more closely scrutinize prisoners'
sincerity in their religious beliefs. See Cooper, supra note 229, at 344-46.
239. See 139 Cong. Rec. S14,353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Reid).
The Reid Amendment provided the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act or any
amendment made by this Act, shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in
any way address that portion of the First Amendment regarding laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion, with respect to any individual who is incarcerated in a Federal, State, or local correctional, detention, or penal facilityincluding any correctional, detention, or penal facility that is operated by a
private entity under a contract with the government.
Id at S14,366 (statement of Sen. Simpson).
240. See id at S14,350-68. Senator Orrin Hatch argued against the Reid Amendment on behalf of the "Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion," which included
about 75 religious organizations who "reviewed and studied this issue and ... overwhelmingly rejected this amendment." Id. at S14,362 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
241. See id at S14,351 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
242. Id
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involve free exercise claims .... 2 Senator Orrin Hatch continued
the onslaught against the Reid Amendment by stating that "[tihis
amendment will deprive many prisoners of their religion in a misguided attempt to address the prisoner litigation crisis. '2 44 After two
days of intense debate, the Senate rejected the Reid Amendment by a
vote of 58 to 41,245 and an exemption-free RFRA was signed into law
two weeks later.2 46 In essence, the Senate's rejection indicates that
the free exercise of religious prisoners was considered equally important as the free exercise of non-prisoners.
3.

The RFRA'S Effect on O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz

The RFRA clearly states that its purpose is to mitigate the ill effects
of Smith.24 7 It is unclear, however, what effect the RFRA had on the
O'Lone standard, which courts had used to evaluate prisoners' free
exercise claims prior to the RFRA. 48 The House and Senate Reports
surrounding the RFRA suggest that the RFRA overturned O'Lone.2 4 '
The Senate Report stated that O'Lone weakened prisoners' rights and
that the RFRA would restore the traditional protection that was given
to prisoners prior to O'Lone2 5 ° The House Report also stated that
the RFRA would essentially raise the O'Lone standard to the compelling interest standard of the RFRA.2 5 '
Although both the Senate and House Reports improperly characterized pre-O'Lone case law as a period of strict scrutiny,25 2 both "unequivocally stated that the O'Lone standard was too weak and that
243. Id. (quoting from letter written by Attorney General Robert Abrams on behalf of and signed by 12 other Attorneys General).
244. Id. at S14,363 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
245. Id. at S14,468 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
246. Solove, supra note 84, at 473.
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
248. Cooper, supra note 229, at 332. Under O'Lone, a prison could burden a prisoner's religious rights provided the prison's actions were justified by a "legitimate"
penological interest, whereas the RFRA requires a compelling governmental interest
to burden religion. Solove, supra note 84, at 473. In addition, while O'Lone only
requires that there be no less burdensome alternatives to the regulation, the RFRA
requires that the government use the least restrictive means possible when implcmenting regulations. Id.
249. S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 9-11 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 7-8 (1993); see
also Lupu, supra note 220, at 191 (stating that the RFRA explicitly overruled
O'Lone).
250. S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 10 (1993). One scholar has noted that the Senate Reports indicate that the pre-O'Lone standard was misinterpreted because prior to
O'Lone, prisoners might have had more rights, yet the compelling interest test was
not applied to evaluate prisoners' free exercise claims. See Solove, supra note 84, at
473.
251. H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 7-8 (1993).
252. S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 9-10 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 7 (1993); see also
Solove, supra note 84, at 473 (noting that these reports indicate that the pre-O'Lone
standards were misinterpreted).
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RFRA would heighten the protection. "2-3 Despite the defeat of the
Reid Amendment, there was tremendous debate as to the proper interpretation of "compelling interest" in the prison context.2- 4 The
Senate Reports indicate that although prisoners should receive
greater protection than they received under the O'Lone standard,
there was still concern regarding the proper amount of deference that
should be given to prison officials in weighing free exercise claims
against penological interests.- 5 - The Senate Committee on the Judiciary found that the RFRA should not "impose a standard that would
exacerbate the difficult and complex challenges of operating the Nation's prisons and jails in a safe and secure manner .... [C]ourts
[should] continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators ...."I'
Despite the perceived difference between the standard articulated
in the RFRA and O'Lone, neither the House Report nor the Senate
Report provided an example of a religious practice that would be permitted under the RFRA but not under the O'Lone standard. " 7 Three
conclusions, however, can be drawn from the Reports: (1) the application of the RFRA to prisons was explicitly considered; (2) Congress
rejected a prisoner exemption from the RFRA; and (3) the RFRA
was designed to impose a stricter standard than that of O'Lone,
although Congress did not clearly articulate the appropriate standard. 8 As the following sections illustrate, the RFRA did indeed
accord more "free exercise" protection to Jewish prisoners.
B.

The RFRA 's Effect on Jewish Prisoners

As many commentators and scholars had predicted, the RFRA generally produced positive results for all prisoners. "- The majority of
253. Solove, supra note 84, at 474.
254. See 139 Cong. Rec. S14,469 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Grassley); id. at S14,468 (statement of Sen. Feingold); id. at S14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26,

1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Cooper, supra note 229, at 332 (noting that
"there were pains taken to make a record in the legislative history to help guide the

courts in applying RFRA").
255. See S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 9-11 (1993).

256. Id.at 10; see also Cooper, supra note 229, at 333 ("[Tlhe legislative history
surrounding the defeat of the Reid Amendment shows that the Senate intended to

mitigate RFRA's effects on prison management by defining compelling interest in
such a way that prison administrators would almost always be able to justify prison
regulations as furthering a compelling interest.").

257. See Lupu, supra note 220, at 193. Professor Lupu also notes that -neither
Report suggested any religious practice that RFRA would protect in civil society, but
that could be suppressed in prison under some greater degree of deference to prison
administrators than civil administrators." Id.
258. Id. "Presumably, prison officials must now meet a burden of persuasion con-

cerning the reasons for suppression and the costs and dangers of nonsuppression, beyond that which O'Lone had imposed." Id.
259. See, e.g., Zogry, supra note 136, at 935 (noting that the RFRA would inevitably have a positive effect on Jewish prisoners).
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courts applied the compelling interest mandated by the RFRA which,
in many instances, proved too difficult a standard for prison administration to overcome. 60 There were courts, however, that found that
Jewish prisoners were insincere in their religious beliefs, or alternatively, that their religious practice was not substantially
burdened,
2 61
which resulted in victories for prison administration.
After the passage of the RFRA, every court applied the RFRA to
prisoners' free exercise claims.262 As a result, courts evaluating Jewish
prisoners' free exercise claims found that the claims should be evaluated by
a much stricter standard than had been used during the Turner
26 3
era.

In many cases involving Jewish prisoners' free exercise claims,
courts applied a compelling interest analysis, as dictated by the
RFRA, and found for the prisoner. For example, in Ward v. Walsh,2 6
a Jewish prisoner claimed that he was forced to violate his religious
beliefs when, on a number of occasions, the prison transported him in
a vehicle on Sabbath.

65

The first time the Ninth Circuit heard the

appeal, they remanded to the District Court to make certain findings
260. See infra text accompanying notes 263-73.
261. See infra text accompanying notes 274-79.
262. See Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that undoubtedly,
the RFRA applies to First Amendment claims of prisoners); Harris v. Lord, 957 F.
Supp. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the RFRA's compelling interest standard applies in the prison context); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 204-12
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the structure of the statute and the legislative history
surrounding the statute indicate that the RFRA was intended to replace O'Lone with
a stricter standard); Allah v. Menei, 844 F. Supp. 1056, 1062-63 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (using
the House and Senate Reports to find that the RFRA is the appropriate standard to
govern prisoners' free exercise claims); see also Lupu, supra note 220, at 203 (stating
that all courts evaluating prisoner claims found that the RFRA overrules O'Lone);
Cooper, supra note 229, at 338 (noting that all courts that considered whether the
RFRA applies to prisoners found that it did).
263. See Lupu, supra note 220, at 203-05 (discussing the RFRA's effect on prisoner
litigation). The fact that courts were using a stricter standard to evaluate prisoner
claims did not, however, result in an automatic victory for the prisoner. See Davidson
v. Davis, No. 92 Civ. 4040, 1995 WL 60732, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1995) (applying
the RFRA standard, yet finding that "before the burden shifts to the Government,
however, a plaintiff must make a threshold showing that his religious exercise has
been substantially burdened") (citing Boone v. Commissioner of Prisons, No. Civ.A.
93-5074, 1994 WL 383590, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1994)). In fact, there were a
number of courts that were compensating for the stricter RFRA standard by finding
that prisoners' free exercise was not substantially burdened. See id. at *6; Prins v.
Coughlin, No. 94 Civ. 2053, 1995 WL 378526, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1995), afj'd, 76
F.3d 504 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs religious beliefs were not substantially burdened); Levinson-Roth v. Parries, 872 F. Supp. 1439, 1451-52 (D. Md. 1995)
(same). But see Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that a
court should undertake a broad understanding of substantial burden); Lewis v. Scott,
910 F. Supp. 282, 291 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that a grooming policy substantially
burdened the plaintiff's free exercise of religion).
264. No. 95-15225, 1996 WL 19251 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1996) (hereinafter Ward II).
265. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1993).
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in accordance with Turner.2 6 6 Before the District Court could make
those findings, the RFRA was passed.2 67 The District Court, as per

the instructions of the higher court, used the Turner standard."s
When the case came before the Ninth Circuit a second time, it reversed the District Court's holding and instructed the court to use the
altered the standard for analyzing prisoners' free exerRFRA, "which
26 9
cise claims.,

This prisoner-friendly trend was also evident in Estep v. Dent,"O
where an Orthodox Jewish prisoner sought a preliminary injunction to
prohibit the prison administration from cutting his earlocks.271 The
Western District of Kentucky found that the RFRA applied to prisoners, like Estep, who were sincere in their religious beliefs.2" The
court held that Estep's exercise of religion was substantially burdened
and, because the prison could not meet the compelling interest standard, granted an injunction.27
Not every court applying the RFRA's stricter standard found for
the prisoner however. In Best v. Kelly,274 the plaintiff requested that
he be allowed to attend Jewish services, be provided kosher food, and
be permitted to wear his yarmulke outside his prison cell.2 7 5 The
Western District of New York found that preventing the plaintiff from
attending services and receiving kosher food for a short period of time
did not substantially burden the plaintiff's exercise of religion. 76 Furthermore, the court noted that the prison had legitimate security reasons in preventing the plaintiff from attending religious services.'
As to Best's request to wear his yarmulke at all times, the court relied
on Young v. Lane,27 8 to find that there is no right to wear a yarmulke
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Ward 11, 1996 WL 19251, at *1.
See id.
Id.

270. 914 F. Supp. 1462 (W.D. Ky. 1996).

271. Id. at 1464. The plaintiff stated that he adhered to the tenets of Orthodox
Hasidic Judaism which prohibits an observer from shaving his earlocks. Id. at 1465.

Therefore, every time the plaintiff's earlocks were shaved, his First Amendment rights
were violated. Id

272. Id. at 1466-67. The court found that the determination of whether an individual is sincere in their religious beliefs is a factual question. Id. at 1466. The court
looked to the record which showed that the plaintiff is "Jewish, keeps kosher, studies
Hebrew, and observes the Jewish holidays." Id. at 1467.
273. Id. at 1467-68; see also Helbrans v. Coombe, 890 F. Supp. 227, 230 (S.D.N.Y.

1995) (granting an injunction to prevent a prison from shaving an Orthodox Jewish
prisoner). But see Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734, 736 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (holding

that even though the RFRA standard governs prisoners' free exercise claims, the
prison
274.
275.
276.

had a compelling interest to shave all prisoners).
879 F. Supp. 305 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 306, 309.
Id. at 308-09.

277. Id. at 309.
278. 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991); see supra text accompanying notes 198-202.
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outside a prison cell. 279 The result in Best is an anomaly, however,
because most free exercise claims brought in the three years while the
RFRA standard governed, were decided in favor of Jewish
prisoners.280
Although Jewish prisoners were generally successful during this era,
a number of courts found for the prisoners without explicitly relying
on the RFRA. Rather, these courts found that the prison could not
justify its actions even under the more deferential Turner standard. In
Bass v. Grottoli,281 for example, a Jewish inmate alleged that prison
officials interfered with Sabbath services and with his right to pray
with a quorum.282 The court avoided deciding whether the RFRA
was the appropriate standard to govern the claim.283 Instead, the
court held that even under the Turner standard, all prisoners "should
' 28
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend religious services. "
The same result occurred in Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek,28 5 when the

Ninth Circuit found that a prisoner was entitled to kosher food even if
Turner was still the law.286 In Ashelman, a magistrate judge found
that a prison was not required to provide a Jewish prisoner kosher
food at every meal because the prison had reasonable concerns about
cost and favoritism.287 The Ninth Circuit avoided applying the RFRA
by stating that, even under the prison-friendly Turner standard, there
were reasonable alternatives which could have been used to provide
kosher food three meals daily.288
C. City of Boerne v. Flores
On June 25, 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores,28 9 the Supreme Court
decided "two of the most important and contested issues of modern
constitutional law ....

"290

The first of the two issues dealt with the

scope of the right of free exercise of religion. 29 1 The second issue dealt
with the relationship between congressional and judicial authority. 92
In Boerne, a Texas church received permission from the Archbishop
279. Best, 879 F. Supp. at 309.
280. See supra notes 259-73 and accompanying text.
281. No. 94 Civ. 3220. 1995 WL 565979 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1995).
282. Id. at *1. There was one particular instance where a prison official removed
some of the prisoners from prayer services, which precluded the plaintiff from saying
Kaddish (prayer to memorialize the anniversary of the death of a parent) because
such prayer requires a quorum of ten Jewish adult males. Id.; see supra Part I.A.3.
283. Bass, 1995 WL 565979, at *4.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 677.
Id. at 676.
See id. at 678.
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).

290. Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique

of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 153 (1997).
291. Id.
292. Id.
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of San Antonio to enlarge its building.2 93 A few months later, the
Boerne City Council authorized its Historic Landmark Commission to
preapprove any construction affecting landmarks or buildings in the

historic district.2 94 Subsequently, the Archbishop of San Antonio ap-

plied for a permit to commence construction on St. Peter's Church. 95
The application was denied by the city authorities because the church
was within the historic district.2 96 The church filed suit in federal district court, alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it
violated the RFRA.2 97 The District Court found that by enacting the
RFRA,Congress had exceeded the scope of the enforcement clause
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 1 The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress's passage of the RFRA was within
their constitutional power.2 99 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine the RFRA's constitutionality. 0
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a discussion of the congressional enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 1' Under its enforcement power, Congress can enact
legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations even if in
the process it prohibits conduct which itself is not unconstitutional.3"2
The Court noted that "Congress' power under § 5, however, extends
only to 'enforcing' the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment....
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. '30 3 Furthermore, Congress has
been granted the power to enforce the Constitution, not to determine
what "constitutes a constitutional violation."'
Although Congress
can enact legislation affecting the free exercise of religion, its Section
Five power to enforce is remedial, or preventive at most. 30 5 The
Court emphasized that Congress's ability to remedy or prevent consti293. Boeme, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
294. Id.

295. Id.
296. Id297. Id
298. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
299. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1996).
300. 117 S.Ct. 293 (1996).
301. Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2162. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant
part: "Section 1 ....No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
302. Boeme, 117 S.Ct. at 2163. The Court cited as an example, congressional suspension of literacy tests as part of voting requirements as a means of combating racial
discrimination. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
303. Id. at 2164.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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tutional violations must be distinguished from enacting measures
which make a change in the substantive law. 30 6 Then, the Court went
through a historical analysis to indicate that Congress's power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is remedial rather than
substantive. 7 The Court noted that even in the earliest cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment, it had held that the Enforcement
Clause merely gave Congress power to enact protective legislation,
not general legislation.3 0° Furthermore, Congress can not define its
own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning because by doing so the Constitution would no longer be the supreme
law of the land.30 9

In applying this analysis to the Congressional enactment of the
RFRA, the Court stated that even if the RFRA was an appropriate
remedial use, the law must still "be considered in light of the evil
presented."31 The church contended that the RFRA was enacted as
a means to protect free exercise by remedying laws which are enacted
with the "unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and
practices." 31 ' Despite this argument, the Court found that the
RFRA's most noticeable shortcoming was that it was not remedial or
preventive in nature. l Furthermore, the Court noted that the RFRA
was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior. 3 13 Rather, it appeared that Congress attempted to substantively change constitutional protections, and to
proscribe state conduct that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit.314 The Court felt that were such Congressional conduct constitutional, any law would be "subject to challenge at any time by any
individual who alleges a substantial burden on his or her free exercise
of religion., 315 The Court subsequently held that the RFRA was not a
proper exercise of Congress's enforcement power because it contra306. Id.
307. Id. at 2164-70.
308. Id. at 2166 (citing the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883)). The Court
further stated that "[a]ny suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial

power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law." Id. at
2167.
309. Id. at 2168.
310. Id. at 2169.
311. Id. at 2168.
312. Id. at 2170.
313. Id.
314. Id. "[RFRA's] [s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description
and regardless of subject matter." Id.
315. Id. The Court felt that requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest
and that the least restrictive means were employed would be too strict, because this
test is the most demanding constitutional standard. Id. at 2171.
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dicted vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and
the federal-state balance.316
As the leaders of many religious groups predicted, the Boerne decision led many courts to resort to the low-level standard of Turner that
grants deference to prison administration, which had been largely unused during the three years that the RFRA was the law. 3 17 Although
the Turner standard of reasonableness has been the predominant standard used by courts to evaluate religious prisoners' claims, courts are
recognizing free exercise rights that were granted prior to the
RFRA.31

Since Boerne, there has been only one case involving an

Orthodox Jewish prisoner, Ashelman v. Lewis. 31 9 In that case, the
Ninth Circuit stated that, in light of Boerne, the prisoner's free exercise claims would be evaluated under the Turner standard.3 20
Ashelman appealed a denial of an injunction and contended that the
prison's grooming policy violated his religious beliefs, and, further,
that he was restricted from keeping religious items in his cell. 32 t The
court cited two Turner-era cases dealing with the contours of these
claims and held that because Ashelman would likely not succeed in his
claims, he was not entitled to an injunction. 31 As Ashelman indicates, Boerne ultimately has returned the prisoner
free exercise standard back to Turner. Anticipating such a result, following the Boerne decision, legislators promptly planned legislation to
counter the effects of Boerne.
III.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF CI7
OF B OERNE V. FL ORES

Immediately after Boerne, lobbyists and religious groups sprung
into action to persuade politicians to draft and enact legislation that
would regenerate the RFRA's strict protection of religion. Various
316. Id at 2172.
317. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the

decision in Boerne restores the reasonableness test of Turner to free exercise cases);
Washington v. Garcia, 977 F. Supp. 1067, 1070-72 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that because the RFRA was overruled in Boerne, the appropriate standard to evaluate free
exercise claims is the standard in place prior to the RFRA, specifically, the reasonableness standard used in Tiner and O'Lone); Africa v. Horn. 701 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997) (holding in a post-Boerne case that the -compelling interest standards set forth in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act are no longer applicable"
and choosing to use the "reasonableness" standard used by the O'Lone court).
318. See, e.g., Wesley v. Kalos, No. 97 Civ. 1598, 1997 WL 767557 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.

11, 1997) (holding that a Muslim prisoner was entitled to Halal meat-meat prepared
according to Islamic requirements-because the Second Circuit has long recognized
that, barring any legitimate penological interest, dietary requests will be met).
319. No. 96-16366, 1997 WL 577203 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1997).
320. Id at *1.
321. Id
322. Id. Interestingly enough, Ashelman had made similar claims during the

RFRA-era and was victorious. See supra text accompanying notes 285.88. This lends
credence to the notion that Boerne gravely affects religious prisoners.
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proposals have been raised since Boerne and Congress has held numerous hearings to evaluate the opinions and proposals geared towards reenacting the RFRA's purpose.
This part analyzes three proposals raised during the last few months
which are aimed at protecting religious freedom. First, this part discusses the possibility of a constitutional amendment to renew the
RFRA in amendment form. Next, this part raises the possibility of
states relying on their own state constitutions to protect free exercise.
This approach looks to a number of state courts which have already
held that their state constitutions accord greater free exercise protection than the federal Constitution. The third solution, advocated by
numerous constitutional law experts, is to draft a new federal RFRA
under congressional powers which are more likely to survive judicial
scrutiny, unlike the original RFRA's reliance on Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, the most commonly suggested
approaches encourage Congress to use the Spending Clause or the
Commerce Clause. This part contends that although these three proposals are well-intended, each one would not be able to provide the
broad protection of the federal RFRA.
A.

ConstitutionalAmendment

Some scholars have suggested that the best way to counter the
Supreme Court's holding in Boerne is to enact a constitutional amendment to protect religious freedom. 3 23 Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, a constitutional law scholar, believes that an amendment would
restore the protections of the RFRA. 324 According to Professor Paulsen, Congress has an equal role in interpreting the Constitution and
ensuring that the states and the judiciary branch respect and enforce
the rights of the people under the Constitution. 325 By enacting a constitutional amendment, Congress would be able to protect individual
rights and "restore ... the original understanding of religious liberty

under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. '326 At a
minimum, the effort expended to pass an amendment would help give
the states momentum to pass laws protecting religious exercise, in a
similar fashion to what the failed Equal Rights Amendment did for
state laws.3 27

323. See Religious Freedom: Hearings on Congress's ConstitutionalRole in Protecting Religious Liberty Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate,
105th Cong. (Oct. 1, 1997) (statement of Prof. Michael Stokes Paulsen), available in
1997 WL 14152193 [hereinafter Paulsen's Testimony]; see infra text accompanying
notes 328-29.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See Supreme Court Decision on Religious Issues: ProtectingReligious Freedom
After City of Boerne v. Flores Written Testimony to the Subcommittee on the Constitution, House Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong. (July 14, 1997) (written statement of
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Professor Nathan Lewin, a noted expert in the area of religious liberty, contends that it is ironic that at a time when the United States
has been instrumental in protecting religious rights in foreign countries, its own constitution has been interpreted to forbid Congress
from enacting legislation to protect religious minorities in the United
States.3
Furthermore, Lewin argues that if religious freedom will
continuously be viewed with an "originalist understanding," the Constitution must be revised to properly define the free exercise of
religion.3 29

The constitutional amendment proposal has been criticized because
an attempt to pass any new amendment was rightly made "difficult by
the framers of our Constitution" and, accordingly, will not be passed
for a prolonged period of time.330 In addition, during the time in
which the amendment would be drafted, debated, and voted on, all
religious groups would be without legislative protection.3 For example, during the time it would take to draft an amendment, Jewish prisoners might not be allowed to wear their yarmulkes. 32 Moreover, all
constitutional amendments have a tendency of being drafted too
broadly,3 33 and it can take decades before the true meaning of the
amendment will be understood by the courts.3-' Even if there was
widespread support for a constitutional amendment, there would be
Prof. Thomas C. Berg), available in 1997 WL 11234759 [hereinafter Berg's Testimony]
(noting that the failed Equal Rights Amendment helped women procure more rights
at the state level).
328. See Nathan Lewin, It's Tune for a Religious Freedom Amendment, Wash. Post,
July 3, 1997, at A19 (arguing that it is "peculiar" that the Constitution forbids a unanimous Congress from protecting religious freedom).
329. Id. Professor Lewin advocates drafting a constitutional amendment which
would exempt prisoners from coverage. Id. The amendment would read: "No free
person's exercise of religion shall be burdened by the United States or by any State
unless the burden is the least-restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest." Id. The language of this amendment clearly establishes that prisoners
would not receive protection as they would not be considered "free persons." Thus,
for purposes of this Note, this amendment would not be a viable solution to protect
the free exercise of Jewish prisoners.
330. Supreme Court Decision on Religious Issues: On the Boerne v. Flores Decision
and the Future of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Before the House Judiciary
Committee, 105th Cong. (July 14, 1997) (statement of Charles W. Colson, President,
Prison Fellowship Ministries), available in 1997 WL 11234758.
331. See id.
332. Id.
333. See John W. Whitehead, Religious Freedom in tie Nineties: BetwtLt and Between Flores and Smith, 37 Washburn L.J. 105, 113 (1997) (arguing that if a constitutional amendment were to be used as a means to protect religious freedom, the

amendment would have to be "properly worded" and "narrowly tailored").

334. Supreme Court Decision on Religious Issues: Testimony on the Effects of the
Supreme Court's Decision Regarding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Before
the House Subconm. on the Constitution, 105th Cong. (July 14, 1997) (statement of
Oliver Thomas, Special Counsel for Religious and Civil Liberties), available in 1997

WL 11234755 [hereinafter Thomas's Testimony].
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dissension in regard to a potential prisoner exemption.335 Although a
tremendous showing of unity supported the RFRA, many state Attorneys General currently believe that the RFRA gave prisoners the ability to raise frivolous claims.3 36 Due to the "negative publicity," it is
unlikely "that a constitutional amendment that did not exempt prisons
could be passed in 38 state legislatures. '337 In sum, enacting a constitutional amendment to counter the effects of Boerne, is at best, a distant solution and should be a matter of last resort.338
B.

Litigation Under State Constitutions

Scholars and public interest groups have also suggested using a litigation strategy as an alternative to pursuing legislative action. Under
this approach, litigants would bring free exercise claims under state
constitutions and argue that religion should be protected to a greater
extent by the states than at the federal level under the Smith-standard.339 The ultimate goal of this strategy is to force courts to evaluate religious claims under a compelling interest test.
340 This approach
has already been employed in a number of states.
Advocates of this proposal suggest that a litigation strategy should
be employed both at the federal and state levels.3 4t At the federal

level, however, litigation aiming to overturn Smith would be a long
term endeavor, because even if a free exercise case were to reach the
Supreme Court, the current conservative bench will most likely uphold Smith. 342 At best, religious groups would have to wait until there
335. Id.; see Michael D. Goldhaber, Religious Leaders Fear Implications of Recent
Court Ruling, Dallas Morning News, July 19, 1997, at 1G.
336. Goldhaber, supra note 335, at 1G; see infra text accompanying note 470.
337. See Berg's Testimony, supra note 327; Thomas's Testimony, supra note 334;
Goldhaber, supra note 335, at 1G.
338. See Thomas's Testimony, supra note 334.
339. For example, in the State of Washington, its Supreme Court stated that its
state constitution affords more protection for the free exercise of religion than the
federal constitution does. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 186
(Wash. 1992) (en banc).
The United States Constitution reads in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
U.S. Const. amend. I. The Washington Constitution provides:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief
and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be
molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the state.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. Art. 1, § 11 (West 1988).
The court compared the language of its own constitution to the language of the
United States Constitution and found that its "constitution is significantly different
and stronger than the federal constitution." First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 186.
340. See infra notes 346-61 and accompanying text.
341. See Thomas's Testimony, supra note 334.
342. Id.
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is a significant
change in the current composition of the Supreme
3 43
Court.

State litigation, however, is more likely to have an immediate positive impact on religious groups because a case can be litigated to a
highest state court within a relatively short period of time.-'" This
approach has been effective in the past, in particular, as a measure to
counter Smith.345 In response to Smith, four state Supreme Courts
interpreted their state constitutions to provide greater protection of
free exercise than the Federal Constitution.
Minnesota, in State v. Hershberger,46 was the first state to interpret
its own constitution over the Federal Constitution in response to
Smith. 347 In Hershberger,Amish citizens alleged that a safety statute
which required slow moving vehicles to bear an orange triangle violated their religious beliefs because the Amish are prohibited from
using loud colors and worldly symbols.-" The Minnesota Supreme
Court acknowledged Smith, yet chose to use its own constitution to
afford greater protection than the Federal Constitution and found for
the plaintiffs." 49 The court concluded that using reflective tape as a
substitute would be equally suitable for safety, therefore, the states
safety interest could be met through alternative means.35 0 Massachu343. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, the two senior Justices on
the Court, were both in the Smith majority. Id. In the event that President Clinton
must choose a successor to either Justice, being that President Clinton was instrumental in helping pass the original RFRA, he would most likely choose a staunch supporter of the RFRA. See id. Despite this optimism, this approach is too passive and is
unlikely to produce positive short term results. See id.
344. See id. Religious groups might obtain significant protection if they merely
challenge a state regulation which burdens religion under a State Constitution. Interview with David Zweibel, Director of Government Affairs and General Counsel of
Agudath Israel of America, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Jan. 29, 1998). Furthermore, it is simpler to establish precedent at the state level rather than attempting to overturn precedent at the federal level. Id. Only by initiating litigation will religious groups discover
a state's position on free exercise and whether the state will implement a compelling
interest test to evaluate free exercise claims. Id.
345. See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise:
An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence,1993 BYU L Rev. 275, 325 (arguing that by
shifting away from Smidi, state courts can provide "robust protection for religious
liberty"); Tracey Levy, Note, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free
Exercise Clauses of Their Own Constitutionsin the Wake of Employment Division v.
Smith, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 1017, 1050 (1994) ("State courts have a duty to analyze and
apply state constitutional provisions independently to protect the rights of their
citizens.").
346. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
347. Id. at 396-97.
348. State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989), vacated by Minnesota
v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
349. Hershberger,462 N.W.2d at 396-97. Accordingly, the court stated that there
are times when there might not be a federal violation yet there will be a violation of
the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 397.
350. Id. at 399.
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setts, in Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission,3 5 1was the
next state to avoid using Smith in favor of its own state constitution.
In Boston Landmarks, a church challenged the designation of their
church as a landmark, which had greatly curtailed its ability to renovate the exterior of the church. 351 The state contended that it had a
compelling interest in historic preservation. 3- The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that this curtailment violated its own
state constitution, and therefore, it did not have to reach a conclusion
on whether the state violated the federal constitution.354
This trend continued in Maine when its Supreme Court decided Rttpert v. City of Portland. 5 In Rupert, the plaintiff argued that he
smoked marijuana for religious purposes only and sought to have his
confiscated marijuana pipe returned. 356 Although the plaintiff eventually lost, the Maine Supreme Court used a compelling interest test to
find that the government did indeed have a compelling interest in
preventing a threat to individual health and welfare, and found no less
restrictive alternative to avoid burdening the plaintiff existed.357
Washington has also interpreted its constitution to mean that free exercise can only be outweighed if a state has a compelling interest
which is implemented by the least restrictive means available. 8 In
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,359 a church again challenged
the designation of its church as a landmark, which effectively prevented the church from renovating the exterior.3 60 The Washington
Supreme Court found that designating the church as a landmark did in
fact burden religious practice, and that the landmark society's stated
interest in preserving esthetic and historic structures was not a compelling enough interest to justify the burden.36 '
351. 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
352. Id. at 572.
353. Id. at 574.
354. Id. at 572. The Jesuits challenged the designation by arguing that it violated
the State and Federal Constitutions. Id. The court balanced the interests of the Jesuits
and the State and concluded that "[tjhe government interest in historic preservation,
though worthy, is not sufficiently compelling to justify restraints on the free exercise
of religion, a right of primary importance." Id. at 574.
355. 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992).
356. Id. at 64-65.
357. Id. at 66-67.
358. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (en
banc).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 178.
361. Id. at 185. There is also a New York lower court case that held that the limitations of Smith do not apply to the state constitution's free exercise clause. See Rourke
v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 159 Misc. 2d 324, 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993), affd, 201 A.D.2d 179 (App. Div. 1994). In Rourke, the court upheld a free
exercise claim of a correctional officer who refused to comply with a hair length regulation on the basis of his religious beliefs. Id. at 329. The court found that although
the Supreme Court departed from the compelling interest test in Smith, New York
law has long recognized the importance of free exercise and "it is hard to imagine that
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Scholars have argued that, under principles of federalism, state

courts have immense influence over the interpretation of individual
and group rights.3 62 During the last twenty five years, state constitu-

tions have been a source employed by free exercise claimants to procure religious rights above and beyond what the federal interpretation
would provide.3

63

Further, "[aicknowledging additional rights under

state constitutions does not cause conflicts" with the Federal Constitution.3 4 A conflict would result only if a state constitution reduced the
rights available under the Federal Constitution. "
Relying on state constitutional interpretation allows free exercise

claimants to benefit from state courts being more knowledgeable
about the various local religions and their complexities.3 6 ' In fact,
"state courts have recognized and protected manifestations of religious life that are deeply connected with the wider society" and are
more likely than a circuit court or the Supreme Court to ensure that
religious practices are "protected from unwarranted governmental
367
interference. 1
Although the state constitution approach is appealing, critics have
rightfully held that a state constitution must be interpreted in relation
to the federal text and interpretation. 3" These scholars argue that
states should give deference to the Supreme Court and depart from its
holdings only for "cogent and persuasive reasons," 3 9 where federal
texts differ,370 or "where a previously established body of state law

New York -would not continue to apply a 'strict scrutiny' standard of review, and a
balancing of the State's competing interests and the fundamental rights of the individual." Id. at 327-28. Further, the court stated that 'aJilthough State courts may not
circumscribe rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. they may interpret their
own law to supplement or expand them." Id. at 328 (quoting People v. P.J. Video, 68
N.Y.2d 296, 302 (1986)).
The Oregon and Vermont Supreme Courts have explicitly followed Smith. See
Smith v. Employment Div., 799 P.2d 148 (Or. 1990) (using the lower standard of review established by the Supreme Court); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 261 (Vt.
1990) (choosing to follow a federal analysis of free exercise).
362. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 550-51 (1986);
Carmella, supra note 345, at 285.
363. See Blount v. Department of Educ. and Cultural Ser'.. 551 A.2d 1377, 1385
(Me. 1988) (applying the compelling interest test to a free exercise claim, yet finding
that home schooled students are still subject to state educational guidelines); Salem
College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25. 34-35 (Or. 1985) (holding
that the state did not violate the school's right to religious freedom by subjecting them
to a statewide unemployment tax).
364. Carmella, supra note 345, at 285.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 314-15.
367. Id. at 315.
368. See infra note 372.
369. Carmella, supra note 345, at 290 (quoting Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch.
Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 847 (Cal. 1991) (Lucas, CiJ.. concurring)).
370. Id.
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leads to a different result."'371 Courts have also been concerned that
extensive state action would result in inconsistent and confusing re-

sults throughout the country.37 2 Moreover, state courts that have af-

forded broader free exercise protection have done so in the nonprisoner context.3 73 It is possible that states would treat religious pris-

oners with a lower level of free exercise protection, similar to the
Supreme Court's O'Lone standard.3 7 4

C. FederalLegislative Alternatives
A more popular and plausible mechanism to ensure free exercise
for Jewish prisoners is the implementation of a new RFRA. In
Boerne, the Supreme Court held that Congress in enacting the RFRA,
exceeded its enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.375 Most scholars believe that a new RFRA can be
passed using the Spending Clause or the Commerce Clause. This section analyzes these two alternatives and concludes that each one possesses flaws which preclude a controversy-free enactment.
Accordingly, this section concludes that although federal legislation is
a better alternative than a constitutional amendment or reliance on a
state constitution, it is not the most preferred alternative available.
1. Spending Power
Three weeks after Boerne, the House Judiciary Committee held
hearings to discuss legislative action to protect religious freedom to
the same extent as the RFRA.37 6 Many notable scholars testified

before the House Judiciary Committee and the most favored suggestion to the Committee was to draft a new RFRA using the Spending
Clause.3 77 Under the Spending Clause, Congress is authorized "to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare
371. Id.; see also Brennan, supra note 362, at 548 (noting that state courts should
give deference and merely supplement the federal interpretation).
372. See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
Nonetheless, we proceed cautiously before declaring rights under our state

Constitution that differ significantly from those enumerated by the United
States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Federal Constitution. Our

caution emanates, in part, from our recognition of the general advisability in
a federal system of uniform interpretation of identical constitutional

provisions.
Id. at 932 (citations omitted).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 346-61.
374. Interview with David Zweibel, Director of Government Affairs and General
Counsel of Agudath Israel of America, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Jan. 29, 1998).
375. See supra Part II.C.
376. Supreme Court Decision on Religious Issues: ProtectingReligious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, House Judiciary
Comm. 105th Cong. (July 14, 1997), available in 1997 WL 11234757.
377. See Berg's Testimony, supra note 327; Paulsen's Testimony, supra note 323;
Religious Freedom: Hearings Concerning Congress' ConstitutionalRole in Protecting
Religious Liberty Before the Comm. on the Judiciaryof the United States Senate, 105th
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of the United States. ' 378 Advocates of the spending power proposal
encouraged Congress to enact a new RFRA to make compliance with
the compelling interest test a condition for state and
local govern379
ments to receive funding for congressional programs.
Congress has been given "great leeway" by the Supreme Court in
applying its spending power.3s0 In South Dakota v. Dole,3s1 the Court
held that although Congress could not require South Dakota to enact
a minimum age requirement to purchase alcohol, it could require
states to do so as a condition to obtaining funds for highway repairs. 38
The Court found that sovereignty remained with the states because
ultimately they had a choice: accept the grant and the congressional
conditions or refuse the grant. 383 In Dole, the Court enunciated two
limitations on Congress's spending power: (1) conditions on federal
3 4
grants must be related to the federal interest in particular programs; 5
and (2) Congress must adhere to a "non-coercion" limitation whereby
pressure from Congress does not turn into compulsion." These minimal limitations on Congress's spending power have enabled Congress
to enact legislation to protect general welfare and would enable it to
enact legislation to protect religion using its spending power.
Supporters of the spending power proposal contend that anti-discrimination laws "prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, handicap, or age in any 'program or activity' receiving federal
assistance. ' 386 In the same manner that Congress ensures that federal
funds are not used to support discrimination, it can ensure that federal
funds are not used to burden religious practice.'
Another alternative has been raised by Professor Daniel Conkle, who believes that
Congress could enact legislation requiring any state or local government that receives federal funding for a particular activity to comply
with RFRA-like standards in that activity. 3 1 Professor Conkle argues
Cong. (Oct. 1, 1997) (statement of Prof. Daniel 0. Conkle), available in 1997 WL
14151551 [hereinafter Conkle's Testimony].
378. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
379. See infra notes 386-89 and accompanying text.
380. Berg's Testimony, supra note 327.
381. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
382. Id. at 211-12.
383. Id. at 210.
384. See id. at 207.

385. See id. at 211; see also Conkle's Testimony, supra note 377 (describing the limitations on the spending power).
386. Berg's Testimony, supra note 327 (quoting Title VI. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994)); see also Conkle's Testimony. supra note 377 (advocating
a model of the RFRA based on the anti-discrimination laws).
387. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974): see also Berg's Testimony, supra
note 327 (stating that the most effective spending power approach is the anti-discrimination approach).

388. See Conkle's Testimony, supra note 377. For example, "Congress might enact
legislation stating that no state shall receive any federal funding-or federal funding
of a particular sort or particular amount-unless the state, as a matter of its own law,
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that by enacting a program-by-program condition, it is less likely that
the congressional action would be invalidated on the basis of coercion,
because a389state could choose whether to comply with federal
standards.
The spending power proposal, as plausible as it may seem, is not
free from criticism. 390 Even supporters of the proposal admit that the
language of an RFRA enacted under the spending power would have
to be very narrow, or the Supreme Court would most certainly find a
relatedness or coercion problem.391 In all likelihood, the Supreme
Court would not "sustain state-wide, cross-agency application of a federally-mandated religious freedom rule imposed as a condition of federal funding of one state program. '' 39 Professor Paulsen argues that
by enacting a broad cross-agency application, the Court would most
likely hold that states would feel compelled to follow the federal
guidelines merely to receive the funds and, thus, the statute would
violate the "compulsive" limitation on the spending power.3 93

In sum, using the spending power as the source of Congress's power
to enact an RFRA is a plausible, but not efficient solution. Although
the anti-discrimination laws under the spending power in the 1960s
were an effective means of legislating against discrimination, an
RFRA under the spending power, would apply at best, on a programby-program basis. Further, if RFRA-type protection would be implemented only to particular programs, prisoners would not likely obtain
much protection.3 9 4

2. Commerce Clause
An alternative power that Congress could use in passing an RFRA
is the Commerce Clause. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has
forbids all state and local governmental action that violates RFRA-like standards."
Id.
389. See id. In his testimony, Professor Conkle mentions some other spending
power alternatives. Id. Congress could refrain from extending all of its spending
power conditions to all federal programs, which would allow states to make their own
decisions in certain contexts, such as prisons. Id. Congress could also decide to
change its RFRA language so that it no longer included the "compelling interest"
test. Id Alternatively, Congress could require the states with respect to programs
receiving federal funds, to merely consider creating religious exemptions. Id.
390. See Paulsen's Testimony, supra note 323.
391. See Berg's Testimony, supra note 327; Conkle's Testimony, supra note 377; see
also John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court and the Demise of the Free
Exercise of Religion, 7 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 122 (1997) (arguing that any
attempt at congressional legislation would only pass muster if it narrows the RFRA's
coverage to laws which impact particular classes of religions or are targeted against
laws which have been used as tools of discrimination).
392. Paulsen's Testimony, supra note 323.
393. Id. Professor Paulsen does suggest that Congress might consider defining the
spending condition as extending to the maximum extent constitutionally permissible
under the spending power. Id.
394. See Conkle's Testimony, supra note 377.
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the authority "to regulate Commerce... among the several States
.,
During the past century, Congress's power over interstate
commerce has been extended to non-economic objectives as well. For
example, the public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,396 that protects against racial and religious discrimination, was
enacted using the Commerce Clause, and was upheld by the Supreme
Court.3 9 7 One proposal, raised by Professor Douglas Laycock, is a
new RFRA which could provide that "any religious practice in or affecting commerce is exempt from burdens imposed by state and local
legislation, except where the regulating jurisdiction demonstrates that
the application of the burden to the individual serves a compelling
government interest by the least restrictive means."39 s This statute is
modeled after the public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 which prohibits racial and religious discrimination in places of
public accommodation affecting commerce. 3 9
As Professor Douglas Laycock noted during a congressional hearing: "Congress did not enact the public accommodations law to maximize the sale of barbecue sauce. Rather, it enacted the public
accommodations law because it was morally right, and it used the
Commerce Clause because that was an available means to the end."'4 u
According to Laycock, the Commerce Clause can protect religion to
the extent that religion affects commerce.4"'
Using the Commerce Clause to ensure religious freedom is tempting, especially in light of the Supreme Court's holdings in the civil
rights cases, yet using the Commerce Clause to protect religion would
offer partial coverage at best.40 2 First, Congress would only be able to
regulate an activity that falls within one of the three "economic" cate395. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
396. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
397. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel. Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
398. See Religious Freedom: Hearings on Congress' ConstitutionalRole in Protecting Religious Liberty Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate,
105th Cong. (Oct. 1, 1997) (statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock), available in 1997

WL 14151687 [hereinafter Laycock's Testimony].
399. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. Professor Paulsen believes that there is an obvious
distinction between enacting the Civil Rights Laws and an RFRA under the Commerce Clause. Paulsen's Testimony, supra note 323. In the civil rights cases, the regulations regulated businesses engaged in commercial activity such as hotels and
restaurants, such that the regulations touched activity that "smelled like" commerce.
Id In the religious liberty context, an RFRA would operate only as a restriction on
state and local power to prevent them from burdening free exercise. Such a regulation is less likely to be considered commercial. Id.
400. Laycock's Testimony, supra note 398.
401. See id.; Paulsen's Testimony, supra note 323.

402. See Religious Freedom: Hearingson Congress's ConstitutionalRole in Protecting Religious Liberty Before the Cottm. on the Judicial) of the United States Senate.
105th Cong. (Oct. 1, 1997) (statement of Prof. Erwin Chemerinsky), available in 1997
WL 14151686; Conkle's Testimony, supra note 377, Paulsen's Testimony, supra note
323; Berg's Testimony, supra note 327; see infra text accompanying notes 404-11.
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gories set forth in United States v. Lopez.40 3 In Lopez, the Supreme
Court held that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress can only regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and "those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce." 4°4 If Congress used the Commerce
Clause to regulate religious liberty, in all likelihood, the Court would
find that the regulation is wholly unrelated to commerce, but rather is
governmental and regulatory in nature. 40 5 As a result, the Court
would only uphold the regulation if the state activity had an "adverse
effect on the ' 4national
economy that was direct, substantial, and
06
demonstrable.
Second, an RFRA enacted under the Commerce Clause might violate state sovereignty limitations that have been placed on Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.4 7 A new RFRA would
"be targeted at state and local governments, and, in effect, it would
require that state and local laws and executive actions include religion-based exemptions in accordance with congressionally mandated
criteria."40 8 As the Court stated in New York v. United States,409 "the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the
ability to require
the States to govern according to Congress'
410
instructions.
To summarize, while some individuals might be covered if an
RFRA was enacted under the Commerce Clause, "most would not be,
including some of the most compelling situations for protecting conscience. '411 The biggest obstacle that advocates of the Commerce
Clause proposal face is that compelling states to protect religious liberty would not generally be considered commerce and, further, such a
regulation would likely violate state sovereignty.
Enacting a new RFRA under the Commerce Clause, like the other
proposals discussed in this section, is an attempt to ensure that religious groups will be afforded some level of protection. All the proposals have merit and would raise the current level of protection that
is being afforded to Jewish prisoners. These proposals however, all
have shortcomings, the most common one being that they all offer
only limited protection and would not cover the same number of people that were protected under the RFRA. The next part, therefore,
argues that religious groups, and religious prisoners in particular,
403. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
404. Id. at 558-59.
405. See Conkle's Testimony, supra note 377.
406. See id.
407. See id.; see also Paulsen's Testimony, supra note 323, (discussing state autonomy limitations on the commerce power).
408. Conkle's Testimony, supra note 377.
409. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
410. Id. at 162.
411. Berg's Testimony, supra note 327.
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would obtain broader protection if states would enact their own
RFRAs.
IV.

ENACTING STATE RFRAs IS THE MOST PRACTICAL SOLUTION
To PROTECT JEWISH PRISONERS' FREE EXERCISE

Because there are various deficiencies with the proposals mentioned in part III, this Note recommends that states enact their own
RFRAs using the strict scrutiny standard of the federal RFRA. The
Supreme Court's decision in Boerne should not alter states' tolerance
of religion, which historically has been the source of the strongest protection of religious freedom.
Part IV first analyzes why state RFRAs are the best solution to provide the same free exercise protection offered by the federal RFRA.
This part then examines the seventeen states that have passed or are
considering passing state RFRAs. Two state statutes have already
been enacted, and most of the other states which are in the process of
passing RFRAs, are considering language which possess nearly the
same language of the federal RFRA. There are, however, a number
of states that are evaluating statutes that either contain language giving deference to prison management, or possess a prisoner exemption.
This part also discusses the various benefits of permitting religion in
prison. Religion in prison is the most effective form of prisoner rehabilitation and, more importantly, it is imperative that Jewish prisoners
be entitled to observe their religion unless a prison has a countervailing compelling interest. Accordingly, this part concludes that
every state RFRA should be modeled after the federal RFRA and
should not provide for a prisoner exemption.
A.

Why State RFRAs are the Best Solution

Throughout the United States, there has always been a "widespread
presence of state and local laws protecting against the infringement of
religious liberty."4'12 States should continue to pursue religious free-

dom for all religious groups and fill any gaps that have resulted from
the invalidation of the federal RFRA. 1 3 Furthermore, states can tailor a state law to fit its own needs. This way, the states would not be
subject to the limitations of a national standard, which might exempt
prisoners from the RFRA.41

4

412. Supreme Court Decision on Religious Issues Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (July 14, 1997) (statement of Jeffrey

Sutton, Solicitor of Ohio), available in 1997 WL 11234760 [hereinafter Sutton's
Testimony].
413. See id.; see also Ellen Friedland, Jewish Groups Back State RFRA, New Jersey

Jewish News, Sept. 18, 1997, at 13 (quoting Assembly member Joel Weingarten, who
stated: "[lit is imperative that the 50 States impose RFRA upon themselves").
414. See Goldhaber, supra note 335, at 1G (arguing that any action requiring national approval will probably result in a prisoner exemption).
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Most scholars agree that Boerne did not limit the validity of the
RFRA as applied to federal activities, facilities, and programs.4t 5 In
Boerne, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to bind the states to the RFRA. 1 6
Congress's power to regulate federal agencies and programs, however,
does not rest on the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, Congress's
power rests on whatever power enabled them to create the federal

agency in the first instance.41 7 Therefore, states need to enact legislation to protect their own prisoners because federal prisoners are currently protected under the federal RFRA.4 18

Practically, enacting state RFRAs is the best legislative solution to
protect Jewish prisoners as well as prisoners of other religious groups.
Enacting legislation at the state level is a smoother and quicker process than attempting to pass federal legislation or a constitutional
amendment because state RFRAs do not require the approval of
other states.4 19 It is imperative to all religious groups that legislation
protecting religious freedom occur as quickly as possible, and state
RFRAs have that potential.4"' In fact, within a few weeks of Boerne,
a number of states were in the process of evaluating state RFRAs.4 2 '
Although an argument can be made that, at best, state RFRAs are42 a2
piecemeal and possibly inconsistent solution to a national problem,
it is better for religious groups to obtain protection at the state level
than to wait for a national solution such as an amendment or federal
legislation.42 3 Another criticism of the state RFRA proposal has been
that special interest groups will be able to influence state legislation to
provide for exemptions they could not necessarily have obtained at
415. Laycock's Testimony, supra note 398; Berg's Testimony, supra note 327; Larry
Witham, Use Laws, Not Amendment, Religious Groups Urge Hill, Wash. Times, July
15, 1997, at A4 (quoting Rep. Charles T. Canady, Florida Republican and subcommittee chairman who stated: "[the] RFRA is still valid as to the federal government").
416. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170-72 (1997).
417. Berg's Testimony, supra note 327.
418. See Zeke MacCormack, Inmates To Feel Church Ruling's Bite: Experts Say
Supreme Court Decision May Slow Flood of Lawsuits by Convicts, San Antonio Express-News, June 29, 1997, at 32A, available in 1997 WL 3178898 (stating that state
and local prisons have been affected by Boerne, but that the "RFRA still is intact at
federal facilities, since . . . [Boerne] centered on congressional authority over the
states").
419. See supra Part III.A. and C. Enacting a state RFRA is similar to the state
litigation alternative in that each state will ultimately fashion an individual law, yet
state RFRAs can be passed a lot faster than it would take to get results from the state
litigation route. See infra Part IV.B.
420. Friedland, supra note 413, at 13 (quoting David Zweibel, Director of Government Affairs and General Counsel for Agudath Israel of America who stated: "We as
a minority religious community cannot wait around for protection at the federal level
while individual citizens are unprotected around the country").
421. See infra Part IV.B.
422. Berg's Testimony, supra note 327; Goldhaber, supra note 335, at IG.
423. See text accompanying note 414.
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the national level.4 24 Although this concern might be viable in some

states, it will not apply in the majority of states as evidenced by the
defeat of the Reid Amendment. State RFRAs would compel state
governments to anticipate the religious liberty ramifications of every
law passed. 4' Moreover, state RFRAs ensure the free exercise of
religion as protected by the First Amendment,4 26 and help preserve
the cultural and religious practices that have made this country
unique,427

B. Current Status of State RFRAs
In response to the invalidation of the federal RFRA, many states
are considering state RFRAs as a means of re-enacting the original
RFRA. Most state RFRAs being considered are replicas of the federal RFRA in that they provide strong protection for free exercise. A
number of states, however, are considering RFRAs that limit the free
exercise of prisoners either by including language granting deference
to prison management or by completely excluding prisoners from coverage. This section summarizes the state RFRAs which have been
passed, and those which are currently being considered.
1. State RFRAs Containing Language of Strict Scrutiny
In 1993, prior to the enactment of the federal RFRA, Rhode Island
and Connecticut enacted state RFRAs which mirrored the language
of the federal RFRA, which was then being debated in the Senate.4 25
The Connecticut statute was the first state RFRA to be enacted, and
provides that the state can only burden religion if: "[Ilt demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."'4 29 Just
one week later, Rhode Island passed a statute entitled the "Religious
Freedom Restoration Act"430 with language almost identical to the
Connecticut statute. 431 During the three years that the federal RFRA
was in force, no other states passed state RFRAs, because the federal
424. Interview with David Zweibel, Director of Government Affairs and General
Counsel of Agudath Israel of America, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Jan. 29. 1998).
425. Charles C. Haynes, Finding Common Ground: Reconciling Church and Zoning Laws, Gannett News Service, Feb. 9. 1998, available in 1998 WL 5621360.
426. Id.
427. Joe Donohue, Legislators Qffer Bill to Bolster Religion's Freedom From State,
The Star-Ledger (Newark, NJ.), Sept. 18, 1997, at 24 (citing statement of Christie
Todd Whitman, Governor of New Jersey, who stated that a state RFRA -is essential
to preserving the cultural and religious practices that are so cherished by this state's
residents").
428. See infra text accompanying notes 429-33.
429. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b(b) (Supp. 1997).
430. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-3(b) (1993).
431. Id. The Rhode Island statute states that the government can restrict a person's
free exercise of religion if.
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RFRA itself provided maximum protection for religious groups.
Since Boerne, however, a number of states have taken the initiative to
promote legislation to protect their citizens' free exercise. 432 Most
state legislatures have followed the lead of Connecticut and Rhode
Island, and have legislative committees evaluating state RFRAs which

provide that government can burden religious freedom only if it has a
compelling interest and enacts legislation using the least restrictive
means possible.4 3 3

2.

State RFRAs Containing Language Deferential to Prison
Administration

The New Jersey and Florida state legislatures are currently reviewing drafts of proposed RFRAs that possess language specifically addressing prisoners and penal institutions. In New Jersey, extensive
debate surrounded the inclusion of a prisoner exemption in a proposed RFRA. 4 3 4

In December, 1997, the New Jersey Assembly

passed a bill that has language which acts as a compromise between
those parties favoring a prisoner exemption and those wishing to pass
an RFRA similar to the exemption-free federal RFRA.4 3 5 The statement following the New Jersey bill states that "courts shall continue to
give due deference to the experience and expertise of correctional
(1) The restriction is in the form of a rule of general applicability, and does
not intentionally discriminate against religions ...; and
(2) The governmental authority proves that the application of the restriction
to the person is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, and
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
Id.
432. See infra notes 433-49 and accompanying text.
433. Eleven states which are in the process of attempting to pass RFRAs are evaluating drafts that use language of strict scrutiny in similar fashion to the statutes passed
in Connecticut and Rhode Island. Proposed bills have passed state assemblies in
three states: California, H.R. 1617, Regular Sess. (Cal. 1998); Michigan, H.R. 4376,
89th Leg., Regular Sess. (Mich. 1997); and New York, H.R. 8499, 220th Ann. Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 1997). The proposed bills are currently in committee in the state senates
of Michigan, S. 678, 89th Leg., Regular Sess. (Mich. 1997); and New York, S. 5673,
220th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
Seven states, Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Vermont have RFRA drafts similar to the original RFRA and are still in the process
of having their bills evaluated by their respective committees. H.R. 2421, 43rd Leg.,
Second Regular Sess. (Ariz. 1998); H.R. 1123, 144th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess.
(Ga. 1998); S.1591, 90th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (111. 1998); H.R. 2370, 90th
Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (Ill. 1997); S. 515, Regular Sess. (Md. 1998); H.R. 1041,
Regular Sess. (Md. 1998); H.R. 2068, 181st Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (Pa. 1997);
S.3054, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1998); H.R. 3051, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn.
1998); H.R. 550, 65th Adj. Sess. (Vt. 1998). To date, only New Hampshire has considered a state RFRA and rejected the idea. H.R. 1470, 155th Gen. Ct. Sess., Second Yr.
(N.H. 1998).
434. See Friedland, supra note 413, at 13 (discussing the differences between Gov.
Whitman's proposal and Assemblyman Joel Weingarten's opposing views).
435. H.R. 6, 207th Leg. (N.J. 1997).
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professionals in maintaining good order, security and discipline, including considerations of costs. However, prison regulations and policies grounded on mere speculations, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc
rationalizations will not meet the act's requirements."'4 3
The text of the bill includes the federal RFRA language which allows government to burden religion only if it can meet the two prongs
of strict scrutiny.4 3 7 The bill states that free exercise of prisoners

should be permitted only if it will not "endanger the safety of other
persons or disrupt the operation of the facility."43 The language of
the bill ensures that prison administration will be shown deference
when making decisions that involve the safety and security of the
prison. The New Jersey Senate is considering a bill that is similar, yet
does not include language requiring deference to prison administration in the Statement.439
In Florida, its legislature has gone one step further than the New
Jersey Legislature by drafting a bill to protect religious freedom which
establishes two different standards for the evaluation of free exercise
claims. In regard to free exercise in general, the government can only
substantially burden religion where its actions could survive strict
scrutiny.' 4 When addressing prisoners, however, the bill states that
the government may substantially burden a prisoners free exercise if
the burden: "(a) Is in furtherance of a substantial penological interest;
and (b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that substantial penological interest." 441
Both the Florida Senate and House of Representatives are currently considering this bill. The Florida bill comes very close to providing a prisoner exemption because prisoners have been singled out
to receive a lower level of free exercise protection.
3. State RFRAs with Prisoner Exemptions
Two states, Ohio and Virginia, have gone further than Florida in
considering drafts of state RFRAs which exclude prisoners from coverage. In Virginia, one draft currently under evaluation by its House
of Representatives provides for strict scrutiny evaluation of any laws
preventing the free exercise of religion. 4" 2 The bill concludes, however, with the following provision: "No provision of this section shall
436. Id.
437. Id The bill states that a government may substantially burden religion only if
"it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) Is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) Is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest." Id. at 4(b).
438. Id. at 6(d).
439. S. 321, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998).
440. See S. 296, Regular Sess. (Fla. 1998); H.R. 3201, Regular Sess. (Fla. 1998).
441. See S. 296 § 3(2), Regular Sess. (Fla. 1998): H.R. 3201 § 3(2), Regular Sess.
(Fla. 1988).
442. H.R. 1 (Va. 1998).
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be construed to afford any rights to any person incarcerated or detained in a state, regional, local or federal correctional, detention or
penal facility .... ",4 There is also another Virginia bill being debated which does not provide for prisoner exemptions.444 In Ohio,
within a matter of days of the Boerne decision, its Attorney General
began drafting a state RFRA. 44 5 Considerable debate between the

Ohio Attorney General and religious groups in Ohio developed because the proposed draft was an extreme departure from the strict
protection of the RFRA.446 The Attorney General's "Draft of the
Ohio Religious Liberty Act" notes that state and local government
can substantially burden religion only if "it demonstrates that application of the burden: (a) advances an important governmental interest;
and (b) is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest. ' 4 47 The draft concludes with the following provision: "This statute does not apply to individuals incarcerated in State or local
prisons. '"448

This proposed draft is a significant departure from the original
RFRA in that: (1) it provides for a level of intermediate scrutiny to
evaluate free exercise claims; and (2) it contains a prisoner exemption. 49 To date, the draft has not been considered by either the Ohio
Senate or the House of Representatives.
The next section contends that states contemplating RFRAs should
follow the leads of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and the many other
states considering RFRAs which have similar language and provide
the strictest free exercise protection for all claimants, even those who
are incarcerated.
C. State RFRAs Should Not Exempt PrisonersFrom Coverage
States that are considering passing an RFRA to protect religious
freedom should ensure that every individual with religious beliefs,
whether the individual is free or incarcerated, is permitted to exercise
those beliefs. "The guarantee of freedom of religion protected by the
First Amendment contains no exemptions .... 450 Thus, any state

RFRA should respect the religious freedom of all citizens. 451 Any
443. Id.

444. See H.R. 668 (Va. 1998) (listing the names of the 68 patrons).
445. Sutton's Testimony, supra note 412; see also Lien Oxman, AG Wants State Religious Liberty Law, Nat'l L.J., July 14, 1997, at A8 (discussing the Ohio Attorney General's plans to enact a state RFRA).
446. Interview with David Zweibel, Director of Government Affairs and General
Counsel of Agudath Israel of America, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Jan. 29, 1998).
447. Thomas A. Smith, Can the Religious Freedom Restoration Act be Adopted in
Ohio?, Ohio Christian News, Sept. 1997, at 4 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
448. Id.
449. See Sutton's Testimony, supra note 412 (discussing the specifics of the Ohio
draft).
450. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
451. See id.
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state considering a prisoner exemption should remember that when
Congress evaluated the viability of the federal RFRA, the Reid
Amendment, which favored a prisoner exemption in the RFRA, was
soundly defeated.45 z A lengthy Senate debate was dedicated to discussing the merits and drawbacks of a prisoner exemption, and the
amendment was nonetheless defeated by a majority of the Senate. 3
In doing so, Congress indicated that religion is a fundamental right of
the highest order and should be available even to prison inmates.4s5
Although an incarcerated individual must give up much of his freedom, denying a prisoner the opportunity to practice religion while in
jail may prevent him from finding a basic foundation on which to reform his life.4 55 Religion in prison can help an inmate "prepare for a
socially useful life."'4 5 6 In fact, it has been suggested that free exercise

violations can be even more harmful to prisoners than to free persons
because prisoners' "means of spiritual recovery are limited by the
'
prison environment."457
Even those favoring a prisoner exemption
admit that religion plays a crucial role in managing a prison and the
"positive effect that religion can have on an inmate is
immeasurable."'4 58
Studies have shown that prisoners who attend Prison Fellowship
programs which counsel and encourage religion, are less likely to be
re-arrested than prisoners who do not attend any spiritual groups
while in prison.45 9 Prison Fellowships are just one illustration of how
religion in prison grants inmates the chance to share ideas about fain452. See id. at S14,350-68.
453. Id.

454. See id. at S14,364 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that religion is a fundamental right to all human beings).

455. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Incarceration by its nature denies a prisoner participation in the larger
human community. To deny the opportunity to affirm membership in a spiritual community, however, may extinguish an inmate's last source of hope for dignity and
redemption.").

456. Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("Religion in prison
subserves the rehabilitative function by providing an area within which the inmate
may reclaim his dignity and reassert his individuality."); see also 139 Cong. Rec.
S14,351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("There is every reason
to believe that [encouraging prisoners to practice religion] will increase the likelihood

that a prisoner will be [rehabilitated]."); Religious Rights, supra note 1, at 854 ("Religious expression can significantly aid a prisoner in reevaluating himself and preparing
for a return to society. In the lonely, stifling prison environment, an inmate can sometimes find great strength and self-respect in religious practice.") (footnotes omitted).
457. Religious Rights, supra note 1, at 854.
458. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,360 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Simpson)

(reading a letter from 0. Lane McCotter. Executive Director, Utah Department of
Corrections).
459. I. at S14,362 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (discussing a study conducted by the
Institute for Religious Research at Loyola College): Mark C. Young et al., Long-Term
Recidivism Among Federal Inmates Trained As Volunteer Prison Ministers, 22 J. Offender Rehabilitation 97 (1995) (research findings suggested religious program con-

tent may contribute to long-term rehabilitation of certain kinds of offenders).
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ily, relationships, and religion in general.460 Penal institutions hope
that prisoners will reform and will not have to return to prison in the
future.4 61 Allowing religion to be more prevalent in the prisons will
help prisons meet these goals. 462 The presence of religious counselors,
religious materials, and the isolation of prisoners have helped produce
low recidivism rates.46 3 These conditions help prisoners rectify their
past mistakes and enhance themselves in all aspects of life. 4"
Advocates of a prisoner exemption argue that an RFRA without a
prisoner exemption will increase the level of prisoner litigation and
will place an undue burden on prison administration. 65 In addition, if
courts use strict scrutiny to evaluate prisoner claims, courts would
have the opportunity to second guess the difficult decisions that prison
4 66
administration must make without the luxury of hindsight.
Although these arguments sound persuasive, in reality, they are exaggerated. First, the penological interests of safety, security, and maintaining order and discipline in penal institutions will weigh heavily
when courts apply the compelling interest test to prisoner free exercise claims.46 7 Activities which are presumptively dangerous will not
In an amicus brief sent to the Supreme Court in regard to Boerne, amici argued that
recidivism is the greatest problem facing correctional facilities. Brief for Prison Fellowship Ministries and the Aleph Institute as Amici Curiae at 11-12, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997) (No. 95-2074). Additionally, numerous studies have
shown that "the greater the inmate participation in their programs, including religious
worship, educational and religious seminars, and Bible studies, the greater the likelihood of rehabilitation, successful re-entry into society, and restoration to their
spouses, children, and religious communities." Id. at 11.
460. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,365 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
461. See Brief for Prison Fellowship Ministries and the Aleph Institute as Amici
Curiae at 10-12, Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2157 (discussing rehabilitation as a goal of the
correctional system).
462. Id. at 11-12.
463. Id. at 6-7 (citing T. David Evans et al., Religion and Crime Reexamined: The
Impact of Religion, Secular Controls, and Social Ecology on Adult Criminality, 33

Criminology 195 (1995)).
464. Id. at 7.
465. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,353-57 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Reid);
id. at S14,359 (statement of Sen. Simpson); Brief for Amici States of Ohio, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, and The Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae at 2-3, Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2157.
466. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,356 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Reid).
467. Id. at S14,351 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (reading a letter from Janet Reno,
U.S. Attorney General); id. at S14,362 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The bottom line is
that prison administrators' interests in order, safety, security, and discipline are compelling, and the courts have certainly treated them as such, and have always done so.
More important, the courts have a well-established history of evaluating these competing interests fairly under the compelling State interest standard."). As to the claim
that the strict scrutiny test will be too difficult a standard for prisons to overcome,
Senator Hatch responded that, in the prison context, courts have decided in favor of
prisons despite a compelling interest test. Id. at S14,364; see, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell,
411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[C]onsiderations of security and administrative expense
outweigh whatever constitutional deprivation petitioners may claim. In this regard,
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survive the compelling interest test.46s Second, prisons will still retain
the authority
to determine the time, place, and manner of religious
469
activities.

Those in favor of a prisoner exemption also argue that an exemption-free RFRA will encourage inmates to file frivolous claims to take
advantage of a prisoner-friendly standard. 470 Despite these concerns,
in reality, prisoners will always find claims to raise against prison administration, even if a prisoner exemption is enacted. 471 As to
the
concern about frivolous claims, courts have always been adept at distinguishing bogus claims from bona fide religious claims. 4" Although
there are no precise standards by which to judge what exactly is a
bona fide religious practice, courts in the past have been able to deny
"first amendment protections to so-called religions which tend to
the court holds that the government has demonstrated a substantial and compelling
interest, that of security, which compels the deprivation of these after-sunset meals
.... "); see also Brief for States of Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New
York as Amici Curiae at 3-4, Boerne, 117 S. C1. at 2157 (arguing that courts always
have and always will give due deference to prison administration in matters involving
order, security, discipline, and safety in prisons).
In the event that permitting inmates to adhere to their religious beliefs results in
additional cost to the penal institution, the cost should not be considered a compelling
interest, but rather should be a factor weighed against the interest asserted. 139 Cong.
Rec. S14,363-64 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 868-69 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (stating that cost alone
should not be a reason to deny an inmate the opportunity to exercise his religious
beliefs).
468. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(reading a letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General). During the three years
that the RFRA was law, no situation occurred in which a governmental interest of
safety, security, and order was compromised as a result of a successful RFRA claim.
Brief for Fellowship Prison Ministries and the Aleph Institute as Amici Curiae at 14,
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2157.
469. 139 Cong Rec. S14,351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(reading a letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General).
470. l at S14,354 (statement of Sen. Reid). It has also been argued that prison
litigation disrupts prison operations in many ways. Brief for States of Ohio, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, and The Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae at 1-3, Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2157. First, prisoner
claims are not easily disposed of which ultimately costs the prison: time, money, and
a diversion of staff resources to the litigation. Id. at 1-3. Second, the RFRA has defeated the goal it set out to accomplish, namely, that there would be sensitivity to
religious beliefs in prisons. Id. at 3. When frivolous claims arise, however, chaplains
and religious personnel are diverted from providing services to the genuine religious
prisoners. Id.
471. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
472. Id "[O]ur courts are well suited to detect the abusive tendencies of our litigious prisoners." Id.; see Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014, 1016-17 (D. Kan.
1991) (finding that a chemical dependency recovery program was not a religion); Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F. Supp. 730, 736 (D.N.J. 1983), affd, 738 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1984)
(rejecting a prisoner's contention that the United Church of Saint Dennis is a bona
fide religion).
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mock established institutions and are obviously shams and absurdities
'4 73
and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity.
A state that enacts an RFRA with a prisoner exemption would not
succeed in preventing frivolous prisoner litigation, and, worse, the
prisoner exemption would have a grave effect on all prisoners.47 4 For
example, a Jewish inmate who challenges a prison regulation that denies him kosher food would be treated the same as an inmate filing
suit because he does not like the color of his prison jumpsuit. 475 Ultimately, it is unjust to allow concerns over frivolous claims to affect
prisoners who have legitimate religious claims.47 6 If a prisoner exemption is passed, "the only real losers" are those who have sincere
religious concerns.47 7
Jewish inmates have numerous religious obligations that must be
observed on a daily basis.47 8 Obligations such as keeping a strict kosher diet, wearing a yarmulke at all times, and praying three times
daily are central tenets of observant Judaism and must be adhered to
even during incarceration. 479 Guidebooks are available to all penal
institutions which can help them understand bona fide religious practices and will enable them to distinguish bona fide Jewish practices
from frivolous claims. 480 Furthermore, by truly understanding the
needs of an observant Jewish prisoner, prison administrators will be
able to determine if the religious practices actually present an unnecessary risk to the safety and security of the prison.48 1
It is impossible to overstate the underlying importance of religious
liberty.48 2 As Senator Hatch implored the Senate during the debate of
the Reid Amendment:
473. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(quoting Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974)). Senator Hatch also
stated: "The Religious Freedom Restoration Act does not disturb established jurisprudence as it relates to abusive prisoners. I have every confidence that Federal
judges will continue to exercise their good judgment in discerning those abusive
claims for special privileges from our legitimate religious practices." Id. at S14,363.
474. Id.
475. Id. Senator Hatch argued that religious prisoners will be evaluated with the
same standard as fraudulent claims which ultimately leads to absurd results. Id.
476. See id. ("However, I am extremely concerned that this amendment allows our
frustration in dealing with a prisoner litigation crisis dictate how we respond to prisoners whose legitimate religious beliefs may be seriously offended.").
477. Id.
478. See supra Part I.A.
479. See supra Part I.A.
480. See Brief for Prison Fellowship Ministries and the Aleph Institute as Amici
Curiae at 5-6, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (No. 95-2074) (discussing various guidebooks that are available to prisons, such as United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement No. 5360.06 (Aug. 29,
1995)).
481. Id. at 15.
482. See 139 Cong. Rec. S14,364 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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Religious liberty is a cornerstone of the foundation of our country
and its evolution into the greatest country on earth. Even the most
scorned in our society, prison inmates, have a legitimate interest in
religious liberty....
...Those prisoners with legitimate religious claims are the only real
losers if [the Reid Amendment] succeeds. 48

All states presently considering or contemplating drafting an RFRA
should keep these words in mind. Any state RFRA which includes a
prisoner exemption will serve the biggest loss to those who need religion most-prisoners.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's invalidation of the RFRA has had the effect
of licensing prison management to limit the free exercise of religious
prisoners. Jewish prisoners, in particular, have numerous religious obligations which historically have been respected when their free exercise claims have been evaluated with strict scrutiny, such as during the
RFRA-era. Swift action must be taken to ensure Jewish prisoners will
have the freedom to once again observe their religious beliefs on a
daily basis. There has been overwhelming response to Boerne and a
number of interesting proposals have been suggested to mitigate the
Supreme Court's invalidation of the RFRA. One proposal, state
RFRAs, is the most viable alternative because it is the most likely to
bear fruit within the shortest period of time. In addition, individual
states are in the best position to know what the specific needs of religious prisoners are. In enacting a state RFRA, all states should model
their own in the image of the federal RFRA, which did not exclude
prisoners from its broad protection. Prisoners must abide by the laws
of the prison, but that need not deprive them of the "most fundamental liberty any human being can claim" 4 -religious liberty.

483. Id. at S14,364, S14,368.

484. Id. at S14,364.
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